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I. INTRODUCTION
You are living the global economy from the minute you are
woken up by your Japanese-brand radio alarm made in Malay-
sia. On with your Italian suit made from Australian wool and
drink a cup of Colombian coffee while watching American news
on television; then get into your German car (assembled in
Slovakia) to come to your office in a multinational firm whose
headquarters were designed by a Chinese architect. There, your
office equipment comes from Korea, Taiwan, the United States,
Europe--or sometimes all of these combined in the one
machine. You might have lunch in a Mexican restaurant run by
Moroccans, and go back for a tele-conference meeting that links
up half-a-dozen national telecommunication systems.
I don't think I need to take you all the way back through the
Finnish sauna to your Japanese futon bed. The point is clear.
And it becomes clearer every day, as interdependence between
economies increases.'
Renato Ruggiero
A. The Development of International Trade Agreements
The world's economy is becoming more and more integrated.2 For the
past 50 years, the number of transactions in the international economic and
political spheres has increased steadily.3 The enormous expansion of trade
and commercial relations between different countries has lead one scholar to
describe the situation as an "international commercial global village."4
' See World Trade Organization, Members of the WTO multilateral trading system must
respect it and use it properly-says director-general Ruggiero (Address delivered by WTO
Director-General Renato Ruggiero to the Herbert Quandt Foundation on June 22, 1995)
(visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/archives/3_l7.htm>.
2 See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
114 (1992).
3 See John H. Jackson et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: Legal Aspects of Changing
International Economic Rules, 81 MICH. L. REv. 267 (1982).
4 1 FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 103 (1995).
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Since 1945 there have been several initiatives aimed at abolishing or
lowering border tariffs in order to facilitate the mutual exchange of
commodities at the international level. The first, and probably one of the
most ambitious treaties was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade5
(GAT f). Created in the year 1947, the GATT attempted to facilitate tariff
reductions between the participating countries.6 Even though the application
of the GAT was based only on a Protocol of Provisional Application,7 its
effect on the world wide commerce was immense.8 The World Trade
Organization9 (WTO), as the "successor"'0 to the GAIT, is expected to be
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947]. The official amended text is found in 4 GAIT
B.I.S.D. 1 (1969). In this article the term GATT is used to refer to the broader GA'T trading
system including various institutions and procedures established pursuant to the General
Agreement.
See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE GA'T: LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY (2d ed., 1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GA'T
(1969); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GAIT SYSTEM (1990).
6 The notions "members" or "member states" were not used in the GATT 1947, as the
treaty was supposed to be bound into the organizational structure of the International Trade
Organization (ITO) which never came into existence. This is why the GAIT 1947 itself
never had the status of an International Organization or consequently an institutional
framework. "The only recognized body consists of representatives of the contracting parties.
[Only a]n editorial device permits ... a distinction between the contracting parties jointly and
those parties acting merely in their individual capacities: the former are mandatorily referred
to as the... 'CONTRACTING PARTIES' (Article XXV)." DAM, supra note 5, at 10-14,
21-22, 335-36. The contracting parties were responsible for making decisions concerning the
Agreement. GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XXV.
7 Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct.
30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, Annex, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
' In 1986 over four-fifths of world trade took place within the GAIT. See Trade Policies
for a Better Future-The Report, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETrER FUTURE 9, 67 (1987).
9 Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
13 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
For general information on the World Trade Organization, see William F. Davey, The
WTO/GATT World Trading System: An Overview, in HANDBOOK OF GATI/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 7 (William Davey et al. eds., 1996); John H. Jackson, Managing the Trade
System: The World Trade Organization and the post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in
MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFTY YEARS AFTER BRETTON WOODS, 131 (Peter B.
Kenen ed., 1994); THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1996).
For actual developments within the framework of the WTO, see its website at World Trade
Organization (visited July 12, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
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even more successful in terms of economic impact." The WTO was
created after seven years of negotiations between 117 nations, with the
approval of the Final Act 12 on April 15, 1994 at the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations.' 3  It was said that this act "represents the most
important change in the jurisprudence of the global economy in the second
half of the twentieth century."'"
Efforts to foster international trade were not only made on a global level,
but also on a regional level.' 5 "[A]ttempts at regional economic integration
'o The notion "successor" used in this context is not to be considered in its legal sense
as implied by Art. 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 339, but in a more political sense to mean that the WTO came into existence
as a result of the last GAT'T negotiation round. For an analysis concerning the legal relation
between the "old" GATT 1947 and the WTO, see generally Gabrielle Marceau, Transition
from GATT to WTO-A Most Pragmatic Operation, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1995, at 147, and
Patrick M. Moore, The Decisions Bridging the GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 317 (1996).
In a nutshell, the WTO "represents a new organization open to those who agree to abide
by the entire Uruguay Round package.. . . Those countries that are not in a position to accept
the entire package, will remain within the old GATT framework." THE URUGUAY ROUND:
GLOBAL AGREEMENT-GLOBAL BENEFITS 27 (Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities ed., 1994). See also Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GAIT:
From the Havana Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
123 (1995).
" See THE URUGUAY ROUND: GLOBAL AGREEMENT-GLOBAL BENEFITS, supra note 10,
at 27.
12 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act]. The WTO
Agreement is one of the five agreements contained in the Final Act. See infra note 46.
For an overview of the negotiation process during the Uruguay Round, see THE GAT'T
URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1994);
JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND (1995).
13 The several negotiations initiated under the auspices of GATT 1947 took place in so-
called rounds. The last one, the Uruguay Round, started in 1986. For a short description of
the pre-Uruguay Rounds see A Brief History of the GAT, in TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER
FUTURE, supra note 8, at 157, 160-64.
4 Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 380 (1996).
15 See Dickson Yeboah, Regional Economic Integration and the GAT, WORLD
COMPETmON, Sept. 1993, at 33. For political and social implications of regional trade
agreements, see SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF THE WORLD ORDER 130-35 (1996).
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have been numerous, with the failures far outnumbering the successes."16
Nevertheless, nations everywhere in the world have concluded agreements
to form free trade areas or customs unions, 7 and they continue to do so.' 8
Among these agreements are the European Union (EU), the Andean Group,
the Caribbean Free-Trade Agreement (CARIFTA), and the African Common
Market.' 9 One of the most recent treaties, concluded by the United States,
16 John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 19
Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1996) (citations omitted). See also WINHAM, supra note 2, at 118.
" The negotiating parties in a free trade area "agree to remove barriers to trade with each
other, while each maintains its own differing schedule of tariffs applying to all other nations";
in a customs union, not only the trade barriers between the member states have been
eliminated, but also goods imported from non-member countries are subject to just one
uniform tariff regime. 1 SWACKER E7 AL., supra note 4, at 26, 48.
The formation of free trade areas and customs unions by nations also adhering to the WTO
is allowed under Art. XXIV GATT 1947. See also REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 5-23 (World Trade Org. ed., 1995); WINHAM, supra note 2, at 109-10, 117-21. For
more information, see generally Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 15
WORLD ECONOMY 535 (1992); John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT, 16
WORLD ECONOMY 121 (1993); Thomas Oppermann, Die Europdische Gemeinschaft und
Union in der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) [The European Community and Union in the
World Trade Organization], 1995 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 919,
920-21; Heinz G. Preusse, Regional Integration in the Nineties-Stimulation or Threat to the
Multilateral Trading System, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1997, at 147. For a recent evaluation
of the relations between the WTO and regional agreements, see Guy de Jonquirres, WTO
Urged to Act on Regional Pacts, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at 10.
18 For instance, the states adhering to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) are planning to establish a free trade zone. See Asean Trade Zone Nears, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1. Chile wants to become a partner of NAFTA. See Chile's NAFTA
Hopes Fade as Trade Pacts Lose US Favour, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at 6. A number
of countries in central-east and south-east Europe are eager to join the European Union. See
THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC 364 (John W. Wright ed., 1996). For the negotiations between
34 American countries about the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
see Geoff Dyer, Americas Free Trade Talks Get Green Light, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at
4. Plans exist to establish the TAFTA, the Transatlantic Free Trade Area to be formed by
the U.S. and the EU. See Oppermann, supra note 17, at 921.
'9 For a complete overview of currently existing customs unions and free trade area
agreements that have been notified under GATT 1947 Art. XXIV or covered or notified under
the 1979 Enabling Clause see Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GAT' B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.)
at 203 (1980); see also REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 17, at
77-89; 1 SWACKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 103-25. A selective collection of texts of regional
agreements' dispute settlement systems, including explanatory notes, are found in 2 FRANK
W. SWACKER ET AL., WORLD TRADE WITHOUT BARRIERS: COMPARATIVE DISPUTE
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Canada, and Mexico, is the North American Free Trade Agreement2°
(NAFTA). Like the WTO, NAFTA also has its origins in another treaty, the
former U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement 2' (CFTA). By eliminating
tariffs and other trade barriers NAFTA is expected to create the world's
largest single market with over 360 million consumers and an output of over
$6 trillion each year.22
Two other accords, the so-called Side Agreements,23 have been signed
in conjunction with NAFTA: the North American Agreement on Environ-
RESOLUTION-PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 2 (1995).
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289
& 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
For general information on NAFTA, see BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA (1994);
ASSESSING NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS (Steven Globerman & Michael Walker eds.,
1993); JON R. JOHNSON, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A COMPREHEN-
SIVE GUIDE (1994); NAFTA AND BEYOND (Joseph J. Norton & Thomas L. Bloodworth eds.,
1995); THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Judith H. Bello et al. eds., 1994).
Links to NAFTA information on the Internet are found at Library of Congress, Global Legal
Information Network (GLIN), The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (visited
July 12, 1997) <http://Icweb2.loc.gov:8081/glin/nafta.html>.
21 Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281
[hereinafter CFTA] (also known as FTA or CUSFTA). See also Gary N. Horlick & F.
Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA, J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1993, at 21.
See ASSESSING THE CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Murray G. Smith & Frank
Stone eds., 1987); IVAN BERNIER & BENOIT LAPOINTE, FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED (1990); JON R. JOHNSON & JOEL S.
SCHACHTER, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1988); DEBRA P. STEGER, A CONCISE GUIDE
TO THE CANADA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1988); THE CANADA-U.S. FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (Daniel E. Nolle ed., 1990); TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE (Marc Gold
& David Leyton-Brown eds., 1988); UNDERSTANDING THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Donald
M. McRae & Debra P. Steger eds., 1988); GILBERT R. WINHAM, TRADING WITH CANADA
(1988).
22 See Scott Pendleton, Clinton, Mexican President Endorse Free Trade Agreement in
First Foreign Summit, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 1993, at 9. For a more detailed
description of the economic effects of NAFTA, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Good for Jobs, for the Environment, and for
America, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 461, 465-84 (1993).
' Even if the Side Agreements do "not constitute a part of the NAFIA as such, [they]
must nevertheless be viewed as part of the NAFIA package." J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: A New Model for
International Collaboration on Trade and Environment, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
273, 284 (1994).
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mental Cooperation 24 (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation 25 (NAALC). This development shows that in addition
to "classical" trade related issues, now other non-trade issues are being
included in traditional treaties.26
B. The Importance of Resolving Disputes Effectively
In order for trade agreements to achieve maximum benefit, they have to
work as intended. This will only be the case if the parties respect the terms
24 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-
U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. For more information on the NAAEC, see
generally Steve Chamovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 257 (1994); Saunders, supra note 23.
2 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC]. For more information, see generally Michael McGuiness,
The Protection of Labor Rights in North America: A Commentary on the North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 579 (1994); Benjamin Rozwood &
Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free
Trade in America, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1993).
26 "The interface of trade with other seemingly unrelated issues (such as the environment)
is an indicator that the world is becoming more of a single society instead of a group of
separate and anarchic societies." WINHAM, supra note 2, at 122.
For the relationship between environment and trade, see generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK.
& ROBERT HOwSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 331-66 (1995); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environmental Law, J. WORLD
TRADE, Feb. 1993, at 43; Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free
International Trade and Protection of the Environment-Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 700 (1992); Christopher Thomas & Greg A. Tereposky, The Evolving Relationship
Between Trade and Environmental Regulation, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1993, at 23; Peter P.
Uimonen, Trade Rules and Environmental Controversies During the Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 WORLD ECONOMY 71 (1995).
For the relationship between labor issues and trade, see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE (Walter Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell
eds., 1994); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE,
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR STANDARDS: A STUDY OF CORE WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1996); Andre Sapir, The Interaction Between Labour Standards and
International Trade Policy, 18 WORLD ECONOMY 791 (1995); United States International
Trade Commission, Trade, Employment and Labor Standards, INT'L ECONOMIC REvIEW, Dec.
1994, at 18.
For the relationship between environmental and labor issues and trade, see Jagdish
Bhagwati, Trade Liberalisation and "Fair Trade" Demands: Addressing the Environmental
and Labour Standards Issues, 18 WORLD ECONOMY 745 (1995); Steve Chamovitz,
Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 WORLD ECONOMY 335 (1992).
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of the agreements and act accordingly. But what happens if one contracting
country accuses another of adopting a national measure contrary to the
agreed terms of the treaty? What if one party did not adapt its law to
conform to the agreement? Many countries have come to realize the
importance of a dispute settlement regime for any treaty.27 Its role "is
particularly crucial for a treaty system designed to address today's myriad of
complex economic questions ... and to facilitate the cooperation among
nations that is essential to the peaceful and welfare-enhancing aspect of those
relations. 28
Indeed, one of the essential questions is whether disputes are settled in a
beneficial way for the parties. This question may decide whether the
arrangement is going to be a success or a failure. Will the parties rely on
the institutions and means provided for or will they resort to unilateral action
on the national level? 29 "A well-designed, contextually responsive [dispute
resolution mechanism] can minimize frustration and tension between parties
by providing procedures suited to their goals and their internal and external
political relationships. An ill-designed [dispute resolution mechanism] can
generate friction and actually contribute to vitiation of the trade agreement
it was created to preserve., 30  Therefore, member states will preferably
accept an efficient conflict resolution system. To reach this goal the dispute
settlement mechanism has to be one that:
(1) investigates complaints on a timely basis and reaches principled
conclusions that are binding and enforceable upon the parties;
(2) prevents multiple jeopardy in the form of commencement of a
series of trade disputes until the domestic industry's result is achieved;
(3) eliminates tactical advantages to both parties so that disputes are
not launched simply to obtain interim relief, which often may dictate
the outcome; and
(4) eliminates the possibility of retaliatory trade legislation that is
27 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 193
(1996) (citation omitted).
2 Id.
29 See John H. Jackson, The Uruguay Round and the Launch of the WTO, in THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 9, at 17; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies along with
Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 487-88 (1994).
" Michael Reisman & Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1995, at 5, 35.
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designed to punish the successful party and/or overturn the dispute
settlement panel determination.3'
C. The Idea and Aim of the Article
The aim of this article is to determine whether the dispute settlement
institutions of the WTO and the NAFTA meet the aforementioned standard,
to compare the two systems, and to evaluate them. An issue that should be
dealt with first is the question of comparability. Both the agreements are
fairly new and both have predecessors. The institutions and their scope may
differ, but they are still conducive to comparison because the underlying
structure of these two international treaties is quite similar. Secondly, even
if major differences existed between the trade regimes, analysis of the
dispute settlement regimes is a narrow field that would not be hindered by
structural differences.32 This article aims to discover the principles of how
the agreements deal with conflict resolution.
This chapter will conclude with an analysis of domestic economic
implications of international trade. Each of the next chapters will analyze
the WTO and NAFTA separately. In chapter two, after a short overview of
the WTO, the dispute settlement regime and its creation will be examined.
First, the old system under the GATT and its major weaknesses will be
presented. Second, the new, reformed WTO dispute resolution mechanism
will be discussed. The following section will assess the new regime and
suggest improvements.
In the third chapter the institutions and scope of NAFTA will be analyzed.
The different conflict settlement procedures instituted by NAFTA will be
examined, including short references to the former CFTA. Finally, this
chapter will close with an evaluation of the procedures and improvement
proposals.
In chapter four, a comparison between the WTO and NAFTA procedures
will be made. The final chapter will conclude with the assumption that trade
agreements which grow with respect to the number of members and subjects
will have to establish a more rule-based dispute settlement mechanism in
order to provide for an effective resolution procedure.
31 Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 735, 736 (1995).
32 For the conception, aims and methods of comparative legal studies, see I KONRAD
ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCrION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1-41 (1977).
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D. Domestic Economic Implications of Internationalized Trade
Why would a country enter into a contractual relation with other countries
that obliges it to decrease its customs tariffs and open up its market? Does
it not lose a source of income for the national budget as a result of lower
tariffs? Does the national economy not suffer from overwhelming foreign
competition? Various responses might be given. A philosophical approach
utilizes the theory that international trade helps to promote world peace.33
However, even from an economical, more secular point of view, transnation-
al commercial relations are beneficial. 34  Adam Smith described the
advantages of free trade for landed nations by writing that "the most
effectual expedient ... for raising the value of ... surplus [produce] for
encouraging its increase ... would be to allow the most perfect freedom to
the trade of all such mercantile nations., 35  Even modem economists
believe that an unregulated trade results in lower prices, a greater variety of
33 Immanuel Kant developed the idea that "[t]he spirit of trade cannot coexist with war".
Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in PERPETUAL PEACE AND
OTHER ESSAYS 107, 125 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publishing 1983) (1795). For John
Stuart Mill, trade is "the principal guarantee of the peace of the world." JOHN STUART MILL,
Principles of Political Economy, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 594 (John
M. Robson ed., Univ. of Toronto Press 1965) (1884). However, "the assumption that [trade]
reduces the probability of war between nations is ... not proven, and much evidence exists
to the contrary." HUNTINGTON, supra note 15, at 67, 218.
In sum, the benefits of international trade can be described as follows:
International trade takes place because no single country can produce
efficiently all of the commodities it needs, and some nations enjoy an
advantage in producing certain kinds of products, either because of a
comparative wealth of resources (capital, labor, natural resources) or more
efficient production techniques. Even an economy with the most efficient
technology has a limit on its resources, however, and rather than using them
to produce all kinds of products, it concentrates its resources on what it makes
most efficiently. It then trades those goods for other commodities, importing
those it produces less efficiently. As a result, all countries are better off;
specialization results in the expansion of the total supply of goods, and the
cost of acquiring them falls accordingly.
THE UNIVERSAL ALMANAC, supra note 18, at 358. The "law of comparative advantage" in
international trade was developed in the 19th century by David Ricardo. See DAVID
RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION (R.M. Hartwell ed.,
Penguin Books 1971) (1817).
35 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 670 (R. H. Campbell et al. eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776).
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commodities to choose from, and in consumer welfare, whereas high tariffs
and other means of protectionism lead to opposite result. 36 However, it is
not only relevant to take a look at the consequences for the individual
consumer, but also to note the outcomes for national economies as a whole.
It may be useful to give two examples: the United States and Germany.37
In 1995, the United States exported goods worth $581.1 billion; its gross
domestic product (GDP38 ) was $7245.8 billion.39  The exported goods
accounted for eight percent of the GDP. At the same time, the United States
imported goods worth $758.9 billion.4° The German GDP was $2407.5
billion in 1995.4' During that year, Germany exported goods worth $506.4
billion, i.e., 21 percent of the GDP, while importing goods worth $441.4
billion.42 These numbers show the importance of international trade for
national economies. As can be seen, exports provide a significant number
of jobs for these two countries. In addition, jobs are created in foreign
countries through the import of their goods. Higher tariffs would diminish
the sale of imported goods and affect the economy negatively. 43 Both the
6 The subject of this article does not allow a detailed analysis of economical reasoning.
An overview summarizing the major arguments that have been put forth for and against free
trade is found in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 5-78 (1996); Robert McGee, The
Trade Policy of a Free Society, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 301 (1990).
17 The United States and Germany were the world's leading importers and exporters in
1995. World Trade Organization, World Trade Expanded Strongly in 1995 for the Second
Consecutive Year (visited April 3, 1997) <http://www.wto.org/wto/Pressrel/press44.htm>.
3 The gross national product (GNP) is the "total monetary value of all final goods and
services produced in a country during a year"; and the gross domestic product (GDP) equals
the "gross national product excluding payments on foreign investments". WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 843 (1996).
" United States Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, U.S.
Aggregate Foreign Trade Data (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.ita.gov/industry/otea/
usfth/t05.pm>.
4 id.
4' Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Gesamtwirtschaft [Economy in its
entirety] (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-bund.de/basis/d/bdl2.htm>. This
conversion is based on the 1995 one U.S. dollar value which was worth 1.437 German marks
on average.
42 Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Census Bureau], Deutschland als Handelspartner
[Germany as Trade Partner] (visited April 14, 1997) <http://www.statistik-
bund.de/basis/d/bdl8.htm>. For the conversion, see supra note 41.
"' For instance, a recent study indicated that a 15 percent import quota on steel "would
save 26,000 jobs in the steel industry," but "destroy 93,000 in the industries that import steel
for a loss/gain ratio of 3.6 to 1." Robert W. McGee, The Fatal Flaw in NAFTA, GATT and
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individual consumer and the business community as a whole benefit from
free trade."
II. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization provides a "common institutional
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members. '45  It
works as a forum for multilateral trade negotiations, cooperates with the IMF
and the World Bank, and is charged with the administration and operation
of the Uruguay Round Agreements (the WTO Agreement, the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU), the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism, and the Plurilateral Trade Agreements).4
All Other Trade Agreements, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 549, 555 (1994) (citation omitted).
4"There is no real alternative to free trade-admittedly an ideal-which rests on the twin
pillars of open world markets and the idea of comparative advantage." Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism: The Need for a
Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 416 (1994). The reason for
this is that "[g]enerally, the total costs of protectionism well exceed its total benefits." Judith
H. Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 416,
417 (1996). Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that, if protectionism rules, the
domestic industry will be better off-and demanding the application of protectionist measures
is not unpopular in the political community. For instance, fearing that the United States'
membership in the WTO will affect the domestic industry negatively, "prominent figures,
such as the Rev. Jesse Jackson, billionaire [and presidential candidate] Ross Perot, consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, ... as well as distinguished members of Congress such as Senators
Byrd (West Virginia), . . . Hollings (South Carolina), Heflin (Alabama), and Brown
(Colorado) [tried vigorously] to defeat the GATT-WTO Bill. Had they succeeded, they would
have caused a monumental financial catastrophe for the United States." 1 SWACKER ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 1. Despite the detrimental effects of protectionism "[e]ven staunch advocates
of free trade must admit that trade liberalization results in net gains to an economy. There
are 'winners' and 'losers,' and the gain to the winners more than offsets the pain to the
losers." BHALA, supra note 36, at 935 (emphasis in original).
45 WTO Agreement, supra note 9, at art. H(2).
4Id. at art. III. The Multilateral Trade Agreements include the Agreements on Trade in
Goods (consisting of, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter
GAlT 1994] and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), the General
Agreement on Trade in Services [hereinafter GATS Agreement], and the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]). The
Plurilateral Agreements include, among other agreements, the Agreement on Trade in Civil
Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement. The Multilateral Trade Agreements
are located in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is
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Whereas the Plurilateral Trade Agreements are only binding for those WTO
members that signed them, the other agreements form integral parts of the
WTO Agreement and are binding on all members.47
The WTO Agreement establishes a complex structure of different
institutions. The highest authority is the Ministerial Conference which
consists of representatives of the members. Meeting at least once every two
years it executes the functions of the VTO.4 s When the Conference is not
in session, a General Council, also made up of member states' representa-
tives, carries out the Conference's functions in order to guarantee the
effective functioning of the Organization.49 One of the most essential tasks
to be completed by the General Council is to determine the responsibilities
of the Dispute Settlement Body.5" Furthermore, it also defines the Trade
Policy Review Body's responsibilities. 5' Under the General Council's
guidance, various councils and committees with different tasks are in-
stalled.52 With respect to the administrative work of the Organization, the
Agreement provides for a Secretariat of the WTO, whose Director-General
is appointed by the Ministerial Conference.53 Currently, the WTO has 133
members, with 29 additional countries (among them China and the Russian
located in Annex 2, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism in Annex 3, and the Plurilateral
Trade Agreements in Annex 4. Final Act; WTO Agreement, Art. H (3)-(4).
47 See WTO Agreement, supra note 9, at art. HI(3)-(4).
48 See id. at art. IV(1).
49 See id. at art. IV(2).
-o See id. at art. IV(3).
5' See id. at art. IV(4).
52 See id. at art. IV(5)-(8). A Council for Trade in Goods (for the Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods), a Council for Trade in Services (for the GATS), and a
Council for TRIPS (for the TRIPS Agreement) are established. These Councils oversee the
functioning of the different agreements. They "shall carry out the functions assigned to them
by their respective agreements and by the General Council." The membership in these
Councils is open to representatives of all member states. Id. at para. 5. The Ministerial
Conference establishes a Committee on Trade and Development, a Committee on Balance-of-
Payments Restrictions, and a Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration to "carry out
functions assigned to them by [the WTO] Agreement and by the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, and any additional functions assigned to them by the General Council." Id. at
para. 7.
" See WTO Agreement, supra note 9, at art. VI para. 1-2. The Director-General and the
staff of the secretariat are required to be impartial and not to accept any government's
instructions. Id., at para 4.
1998]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Federation) having submitted applications to join the new world trade
body . 4 Analysts estimate the Uruguay Round Agreements will lower
global tariffs by over $740 billion55 while increasing world exports by $755
billion56 and raising the world income yearly by $510 billion.57  The
developed countries will reduce their tariffs by 40 percent. 58 As a result
"more than ninety percent of the world's trade in goods is conducted in the
shadows of the trade agreements that constitute part of the [WTO]'s organic
documents. '59  For the United States, the Council of Economic Advisers
estimates that national income will increase by $100 to 200 billion by the
tenth year of the new agreement.'
A. The Weaknesses in the GATT 1947 Dispute Settlement System
Because the WTO Dispute Settlement System is built on the dispute
settlement system of the GATT 1947, analysis of the WTO's Dispute
Settlement System appropriately begins with that of the GATT 1947. Even
if they worked well in the beginning, the dispute resolution procedures
installed by the GATT 1947 had too many deficiencies which prevented
effective conflict resolution in the later years.6' Initially, the GATT
5 See World Trade Organization, WTO Membership (visited Jan. 23, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/organsn6.htm> (this website shows a complete list of current
members and governments having applied for membership).
55 See David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to Ease Trade Curbs: A Victory for
Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al.
56 See The World is Born, Focus: GATT Newsletter, May 1994, at 1 (Information and
Media Relations Division of GATT publ.).
57 See A $510 Billion Boost to World Income, Focus: GAIT Newsletter, Nov. 1994, at
2 (Information and Media Relations Division of GAT'T publ.). This number is much higher
than the Secretariat's prior estimate that the world income would rise by $230 billion as a
result of the new agreements. See The World is Born, supra note 56, at 6.
58 See A $ 510 Billion Boost to World Income, supra note 57, at 6.
59 See Nichols, supra note 14, at 381 (citing Trade Body Launched, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 5,
1995, at 1).
6 See Bob Benenson, With Health Care Receding, GATT Pact Gains Urgency, 52 CONG.
Q. 2661, 2664 (1994). Doubting the validity of these figures, one author notes that the
"[e]stimates of how much GATT would benefit the American economy... vary widely that
they are almost useless." David E. Sanger, Clinton Pledges to Push for Vote on Trade
Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at Al.
61 See BHALA, supra note 36, at 109; Jackson, supra note 29, at 13-14; Pierre Pescatore,
Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in 2 HANDBOOK OF GAT'r/WTO
DISPuTE SErrLEMENT, 3-54 (William Davey et al. eds., 1996); Peter Backes, Die neuen
Streitbeilegungsregeln der Welthandelsorganisation (WTTO) [The New Dispute Settlement
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Articles XX1162 and XX111 63 were the only texts dealing with dispute
settlement, thus being "the most primitive mechanism for interpreting and
Provisions of the WTO], 1995 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft [RIW] 916; William J.
Davey, Dispute Settlement in GAT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L J. 51, 61-65, 81-90 (1987); Peter-
Tobias Stoll, Die WTO: Neue Welthandelsorganisation, neue Welthandelsordnung [The
WTO: New World Trade Organization, New World Trade Order], 54 Zeitschrift fur
auslandisches toffenfliches Recht und V6lkerrecht [ZacRV] 241, 245-46 (1994).
62 Art. XXII provides:
1. Each CONTRACTING PARTY shall accord sympathetic consideration to,
and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such
representations as may be made by another contracting party with respect to
any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party,
consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for
which it has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution under paragraph
1.
GAIT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XXII.
Art. XXIII provides:
1. If any CONTRACTING PARTY should consider that any benefit accruing
to it... under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired ... as the result
of (a) the failure of another CONTRACTING PARTY to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the application by another CON-
TRACTING PARTY of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation, the
contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the
matter, make written representations of proposals to the other contracting party
or parties which it considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus
approached shall give sympathetic consideration to the representations or
proposals made to it.
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties
concerned within a reasonable time .... the matter may be referred to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly
investigate any matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate ... If the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious enough to
justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to
suspend the application to any contracting party or parties of such concessions
or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate
in the circumstances. If the application to any contracting party of any
concession or other obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall
then be free ... to give written notice to the Executive Secretary to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement.
GAIT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XXIII.
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enforcing [the GATT] provisions.""6 "[D]isputes were settled in a haphaz-
ard way" for the first 25 years of GATT's existence.65 Panels were created
in 1952 to take over the duty of resolving the disputes.66 The procedures
operated on customary principles67 until 1979, after the Tokyo Round, when
the traditionally followed procedures were codified.68
In addressing any complaint, the first phase of the procedure established
under the Tokyo Round was negotiation and consultation.69 If they
remained unsuccessful, the party could request the establishment of a
panel.7° It was the GATT Council's task7' to appoint the panel members
and determine the panel's terms of reference.72 These decisions required
unanimity with the principle of each country having one vote.73 The panel
4 Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 560 (1996).
65 See Pescatore, supra note 61, at 4.
' Before the creation of the panels "the contracting parties carded out their responsi-
bilities [to settle disputes] by forming working parties .... In 1952, upon the suggestion of
the chairman of the seventh session of the contracting parties, the working parties were
transformed into panels and became more adjudicatory." Michael K. Young, Dispute
Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389,
393 (1995).
67 Miquel MontafiA i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the
Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993).
" On Nov. 28, 1979, the GATT Contracting Parties approved the "Understanding
Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance," and the "Annex:
Agreed Description of Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement"
which is found at GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210 (1980) [hereinafter Tokyo Round
Understanding].
For the results of the Tokyo Round with regard to dispute settlement, see John H. Jackson,
GATT Machinery and the Tokyo Round Agreements, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980s 159-87
(W.R. Cline ed., 1983); Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round:
An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980).
69 See Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 68, at para. 4.
70 See id. at para. 10.
71 The GATT Council of Representatives was established in 1960 as the Contracting
Parties' intercessional body; it was composed of representatives of all contracting parties, and
had the power "to deal with ... matters with which the CONTRACTING PARTIES may deal
at their sessions." Decision of 4 June 1960 Establishing the Council of Representatives, June
4, 1960, GAT B.I.S.D. (9th Supp.) at 8-9 (1961).
72 See Tokyo Round Understanding, supra note 68, at para. 11.
13 Backes, supra note 61, at 916; Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 479. "The tradition of
decision making by consensus has evolved in GATT practice, but is not specified in the rules
of procedure." Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, Dispute Resolution Under the NAFTA:
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would then hear the dispute and decide on a conclusion with regard to the
validity of the challenged measure under the GATT 1947.74 The panel
report was subject to the unanimous approval by the GATT Council in order
to have legal effect.
75
The Tokyo Round created different procedures for dispute settlement
based on the nature of the dispute. Whereas initially one procedure would
be followed in resolving disputes occurring in all areas covered by the
GAT', some of the non-tariff agreements negotiated during the Tokyo
Round provided for their own settlement system. 6
Unfortunately, these changes did not solve many problems and even
created new ones." During the last years, the method of conflict resolution
under the GATT was criticized sharply because:
(1) as a result of the requirement of unanimity in the Council a party
could easily block or at least delay the establishment of a panel;
(2) the adoption of the panel report could be blocked or delayed;
(3) there were no time limits during the panel process;
(4) there was basically no mechanism to survey the implementation of
the panel reports, and at the end of 1994 compliance with the reports
was less that 60 percent;
(5) the system of sanctioning a country in the case of non-compliance
The Newer and Improved Model, 27 INT'L LAW. 603, 605 n. 10 (1993).
74 See Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 479. Before rendering their decision, "lt]he panels
receive[d] written and oral submissions from the parties [and] prepare[d] findings of fact."
Id. at 477.
75 See OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GAT MULTILATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 47 (1985).
76 "While some of the codes are modeled more [or] less after the general regime
established in the Understanding of 1979 (Codes on Technical Barriers to Trade, Government
Procurement and Customs Valuation), others include a more detailed regulation (Codes on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, and Anti-[D]umping). One includes specific norms but
also refers to the general provisions of Article XXIII and those of the Understanding of 1979
(Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft). Another refers completely to the general regime
(Code on Import Licensing Procedures) ... [T]wo agreements ... do not contain any
provisions dealing with dispute settlement (Agreement on Bovine Meat and the International
Dairy Agreement), thus leaving the general regime to apply." Montafi i Mora, supra note
67, at 124 n.93 (citations omitted).
" See Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing their Sovereign
Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 161, 164 (1996).
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with the panel report did not work;7"
(6) the quality and neutrality of panel members was sometimes of
questionable value;
(7) panel reports were sometimes ambiguous and inconsistent;
(8) the Tokyo Round led to a fragmentation or "balkanization" of the
law, so that several resolution procedures existed and a party was able
to "panel shop" to obtain a desired result rather than an impartial and
neutral panel decision.79
Some deficiencies were corrected by the 1989 "Improvements Deci-
sion,"' but the situation was far from satisfactory, and the prevailing party
could still not be sure that a successful complaint would make the losing
party change its behavior.
Improvements to the dispute mechanism were mainly left to the Uruguay
Round. During the negotiations, the EU favored a pragmatic approach: a
regime based more on negotiations and compromise. At the same time, the
U.S. wanted a more legalistic, rule-based system.8' It is noteworthy that
78 The system of sanctions applied only once a trade sanction was formally approved. See
Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligation to the United States, Nov. 8, 1952, GAT
B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 32 (1953).
7' See Davey, supra note 61, at 81-89; Kendall W. Stiles, The New WTO Regime: The
Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 3, 7-9 (1995); Ivo Van Bael, The GATT
Dispute Settlement Procedure, J. WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1988, at 67, 71-73; John H. Weeks,
Procedures for Dispute Settlement under the World Trade Organization-GATT 1994 and
under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 343
(1995).
so See Decision on Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures,
April 12, 1989, GAT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61 (1990). For more information, see
generally Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement: Moving
towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 38 (1990); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Mid-
Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 Improvements to the GATT
Dispute Settlement Procedures, 32 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 280 (1989).
8I See Philip A. Akakwam, The Standard of Review in the 1994 Antidumping Code, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE, 277, 284-85 (1996); Montafi, i Mora, supra note 67, at 128-36.
For the pro-legalists view, see Davey, supra note 9, at 75-77; JOHN H. JACKSON &
WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 2, 282
(Supp. 1986); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 221-44 (1991); Harold H. Koh, The
Legal Markets of International Trade, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 196-97 (1987).
For the pro-pragmatists view, see LONG, supra note 75, at 88; David K. Tarullo, Logic,
Myth and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 533 (1985); Philip R. Trimble,
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even after the Uruguay Round the GATr 1947 Articles XXII and XXIII still
remain the legal basis for dispute settlement in the WTO."2 They are,
however, "silent as to which approach, adjudication or negotiation, might be
appropriate."83  In effect, the U.S. was successful and the new Dispute
Settlement Understanding is much more adjudicatory than the GATT 1947
system.84
B. Innovations by the WTO Treaty
The Dispute Settlement Understanding modifies the dispute settlement
regime of GATT by changing both the structure of the dispute settlement
bodies and the procedure through which disputes are settled.
1. The Structure of the New Dispute Settlement Mechanism
The new Dispute Settlement Understanding [DSU] which is part of the
basic framework of the WTO, sets up an elaborate regime of provisions built
upon the GATT Articles XXII and XXIII. 85 This mechanism "is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading
system."86 Its aim is to reestablish credibility of the member states into the
WTO conflict resolution process.
a. A Single Procedure
One major improvement in the DSU is that member states have to follow
only one settlement procedure once a conflict arises with regard to the
covered agreements.88 The exclusivity of the system leads to more
International Trade and the "Rule of Law", 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1985).
82 See Understanding on Rules & Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], art. 3(1). The GAIT 1994 Articles XXII
and XXIII still are the same as in GATT 1947.
83 Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for World
Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 395 (1995); see also Davey, supra note 9, at 75-76.
8' Young, supra note 66, at 390-91.
8 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 3(1). GAT Articles XXII and XXIII can be found
supra notes 62 & 63.
8 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 3(2).
87 See Jackson, supra note 29, at 15.
" The DSU covers the multi- and plurilateral agreements listed in its Appendix 1. DSU,
art. l(l).
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coherence because "panel shopping" is abolished.8 9 In addition, there is no
uncertainty in determining the applicable procedure. 90 However, it seems
impossible to centralize the procedures completely because some covered
agreements contain altering provisions.9' Nevertheless, the general rules
will control the majority of the conflicts.92 Interestingly, the DSU encour-
ages parties to resort to binding arbitration as an "alternative means of
dispute settlement."93
Unilateral sanctions, on the other hand, are strongly discouraged. It has
been observed that "[ulnilateral action undermines the multilateral basis of
the WTO [because] it challenges the WTO's credibility and encourages other
countries to act unilaterally as well." 94  Therefore, the DSU directs the
member states to refrain from any unilateral action in connection with
measures infringing rights under the WTO agreements, and instead requires
them to resort always to the DSU proceedings.95
89 See Pescatore, supra note 61, at 30; Backes, supra note 61, at 917.
9 See Azar M. Khansari, Searching for the Perfect Solution: International Dispute
Resolution and the New World Trade Organization, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
183, 190 (1996).
9' See Edwin Vermulst & Bart Driessen, An Overview of the WTO Dispute Settlement
System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements, J. WORLD TRADE, April
1995, at 131, 138.
A list of the provisions derogating from the general rules is found in Appendix 2 to the
DSU. Art. 64 of the TRIPS Agreement and Art. 7(3) of the Textiles Agreement are missing
from that list. Id. at 138 n.33 & 139 n.34.
9' See id. at 139.
9 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 25.
9 Tracy M. Abels, The World Trade Organization's First Test: The United States-Japan
Auto Dispute, 44 UCLA L. REv. 467, 469 (1996).
9 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 23. Authors have noted that the DSU Article 23 is
especially directed against Section 301, which might be the United States' most effective
unilateral trade sanction. See Backes, supra note 61, at 11-12; Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at
481. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 enables the U.S. President to take unilateral or
retaliatory action against unfair trade practices of a foreign government. See 19 U.S.C. §§
2411-2419 (1994).
For the relation between Section 301 and the DSU, see Abels, supra note 94, at 483-526;
William J. Aceves, Lost Sovereignty? The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreements,
19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 427, 439 (1995); Richard 0. Cunningham & Clint N. Smith, Section
301 and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization, in THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, supra note 9, at 581-612; Susana Hernandez Puente, Section 301 and the New
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 213 (1995); Jared R.
Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use of
[VOL. 27:57
WTO AND NAFTA
b. The Dispute Settlement Body
The drafters of the DSU agreed to establish a Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) to be responsible for administering the rules and procedures of the
DSU, establishing panels, adopting panel and Appellate Body reports,
surveying the implementation of rulings and recommendations, and allowing
disciplinary action in the case of non-complying member states.96 The
General Council meets also as the DSB, but the DSB has its own chairman
and rules of procedures.97 Therefore, an "integrated system ' 98 is created.
The Understanding has the same legal authority as the WTO Agreement
itself, while the whole dispute resolution process is woven into the organic
structure of the WTO.99
c. The "Negative" Consensus
Another improvement involves an attempt to speed up the settlement
procedure through the principle of "negative consensus."" All decisions
in the WTO are still taken by consensus, but "the idea of consensus applies
to the DSB in a vastly different manner."' 0 ' A decision is deemed to be
adopted by the DSB unless its members decide by consensus not to adopt the
decision.'0 2 This "most radical innovation"'0 3 has already been hailed as
Section 301 before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 233 (1996); C. O'Neal Taylor, The
Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization Dispute
Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (1997).
96 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 2(1).
97 See WTO Agreement, supra note 9, at art. IV(3).
98 See Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 167.
99 See Pescatore, supra note 61, at 29.
'00 See Jackson, supra note 29, at 14. It is also called "reverse" or "inverse consensus."
See Dillon, supra note 83, at 373. One author even refers to it as the "consensus to overrule."
See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the
World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 901 (1995).
101 Reitz, supra note 64, at 585. The introduction of the majority vote would have
politicized the complete dispute settlement process. Jeffrey M. Waincymer, Revitalizing
GATTArticle XXIII-Issues in the Context of the Uruguay Round, WORLD COMPETITION, Sept.
1988, at 5, 42-43.
102 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 6.1, 16.4, 17.14, 22.6. If a member formally objects
to the proposed decision, the majority vote is introduced with one vote for each member. 1
SWACKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 373-74.
103 See Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 168.
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an "ingenious solution"'" and "perhaps the most important advantage' 5
to prevent a party from blocking the decision making process.
d. The Appellate Body
Finally, "perhaps the most definitive move in the direction of legal-
ism"" is the creation of a standing Appellate Body-07--a "unique and
unprecedented institution in international trade."'0 8  Aiming at "broadly
[representing] the membership in the WTO", it is composed of seven
"persons of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally[, and] unaffiliated with any government."''1 9 The members are
appointed for a four year term,"0 and, unlike the panel phase, the disputing
parties cannot choose who is sitting on a case. Based on rotation, three of
the seven members will hear a case."' The working procedures that are
to be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the chairman of
the DSB and the Director-General contain the schedule determining who will
serve.11 2  Inspired by common law systems,' 13 the Appellate Body may
104 See Reitz, supra note 64, at 585.
'o See Dillon, supra note 83, at 378.
'0 Young, supra note 66, at 403. The establishment of the Appellate Body is even seen
as a "significant step toward the creation of an international legal tribunal on trade." Dillon,
supra note 83, at 379.
107 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17.
8 See Jeffrey M. Lang, Full Committee Hearing on the World Trade Organization,
Federal News Service, June 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLNEWS File.
'09 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17 (3). Professor Lowenfeld made interesting deliberations
concerning the quality of the Appellate Body members noting that "[t]he whole concept may
well stand or fall on the skill and prestige of the first generation of members of the Appellate
Body." Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 485. By the same token, Professor Nichols predicted
that "the Appellate Body will become a focal point for scrutiny of the World Trade
Organization." Nichols, supra note 14, at 453 (citations omitted). See also Reitz, supra note
64, at 602 (discussing difficulties the Appellate Body may encounter).
"The [Appellate Body] was constituted in December 1995, and it took up its function
forthwith with the assistance of a small Secretariat... The criterion of 'broadly represen-
tative' was met by appointing persons from the following [m]ember [s]tates (in alphabetical
order): Egypt, Germany (European Union), Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Uruguay, [and
the] United States of America." Pescatore, supra note 61, at 36 n.57.
"o See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(2).
... See id. at art. 17(1).
1' See id. at art. 17(1) & (9).
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reexamine the case with regard only to "issues of law ... and legal
interpretations"'1 4, and not to issues of fact."1
5
As the panel decisions are now adopted "quasi-automatically,"" 6 it
became necessary to provide for a review mechanism. 1 7 One might even
say that the Appellate Body has been created in order to "compensate for the
loss of a party's ability to block or delay implementation of panel re-
ports."' 18
It is very likely that the quality of the panel reports will improve." 9
One has to bear in mind the stability of the Appellate Body and the limits
of its competence on legal issues. The Appellate Body must build up a
corpus of decisions thereby assuring consistency in WTO jurisdiction and
guiding the panels.1
20
2. The New Dispute Settlement Procedure
Besides the establishment of new institutions, detailed procedural
provisions are laid down in the DSU in order to strengthen the settlement
regime. Also, a tight time schedule for each of the different phases ensures





When a member state alleges that the operation of any covered agreement
is affected by another member's measures, it requests consultations and
113 See Montafii i Mora, supra note 67, at 150.
114 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(4) & (6).
"' The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is not always obvious.
See Croley & Jackson, supra note 27, at 195; Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 483-84.
16 See Ernst-Uhich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade
Organization and the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System since 1948, 31
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1157, 1208 (1994).
117 See John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New
Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 549-50 (1993).
18 Weeks, supra note 79, at 344. See also Jackson, supra note 29, at 14.
119 See Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 40 (assuming that panelists will prepare
better reports when they know of the possibility of appealing the decision).
0 See Reitz, supra note 64, at 584; Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 91, at 145.
'21 Aceves, supra note 95, at 439.
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notifies the DSB. 22 The language employed by the DSU makes it clear
that consultations are to be taken seriously and "[do] not simply exist as a
formality before the establishment of a panel."'123 Interestingly, the drafters
of the DSU did not favor an adjudicative decision at all costs, but "a solution
mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute."'124 By the same token, the
DSU provides for the end of the conflict at any time during the procedure
whenever the parties agree on a solution."2
The DSU suggests other ways of non-adjudicatory conflict resolution such
as good offices, conciliation, and mediation, all of which may be offered by
the Director-General ex officio. 2 6 However, if a member does not reply
to a consultation request within ten days, if it does not begin consultations
within 30 days, or if the dispute is not settled by consultations within 60
days, the complaining party can ask the DSB to establish a panel. 27 In
urgent cases, such as in those involving perishable goods, the time frame is
122 See DSU, supra note 82, at arts. 4(2) & (4). In order to limit misuse, the DSU
provides that "before bringing a case, a [miember shall exercise its judgment as to whether
action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute settlement
mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute." DSU, supra note 82, at art. 3(7).
'23 Dillon, supra note 83, at 381 (1995). To ensure that the consultation phase is in fact
taken seriously, the Understanding states that "[miembers affirm their resolve to strengthen
and improve the effectiveness of the consultation procedures. ... [Also e]ach [m]ember
undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another [m]ember" in view of any
measure that could affect the operation of any covered agreement. DSU, supra note 82, at
arts. 4(1) & (2). A list showing the cases settled by consultation is found at World Trade
Organization, Overview of the State-of-play of WTO Disputes (visited on April 27, 1997)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/disputelbulletin.htm>.
1 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 3(7). See also DSU, supra note 82, at art. 12(7).
I2 Id. at art. 3(6) (emphasis added). The panels are directed to "give [the parties]
adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution." Id. at art. 11.
126 Id. at art. 5. Good offices, conciliation, and mediation are some of the traditional ways
of settling disputes in the area of international law. Rainer Lagoni, V6lkerrecht, Teil 1:
Allgemeine Lehren und besondere Gebiete [International Law, Part I: General Doctrines and
Specific Subjects] 55-56 (W. Mauke S6hne publ., Hamburg 1994).
Pescatore pointed out that "[n]o confusion should be admitted between good offices,
conciliation and mediation, on the one hand, and 'consultation' on the other. Consultation
is a mandatory prerequisite for the opening of contentious proceedings. Good offices,
conciliation and mediation ... are optional measures of amicable settlement." Pescatore,
supra note 61, at 39.





When the Dispute Settlement Body is asked by the complaining party to
establish a panel, it will decide the issue by "negative" consensus, i.e., a
panel will be formed unless it is the consensus of the DSB not to do so. 2
9
As a result of this voting mode, the complaining party practically obtains a
right to a panel. 30 The DSU stipulates that the panel is to be established
at the DSB meeting following the one in which the request was made.1
3
'
The Secretariat holds a list of "well-qualified governmental and/or non-
governmental individuals" from which to choose. 3 2 Parties can oppose the
nominations for the panel for compelling reasons only. 33 The qualification
requirement aims at increasing the quality as well as the authority of panel
reports.'34 As under GATT a panel is usually made up of three persons,
unless the parties to the dispute agree to have five panelists. 35  If the
in In urgent cases a request for consultations must be answered within 10 days, and
disputes must be settled within 20 days. See id. at art. 4(8).
'29 See id. at art. 6.
13o See Backes, supra note 61, at 917.
131 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 6.
132 Id. at arts. 8(1), (4) & (6). The "well-qualified individuals" that sit on a panel include
"persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
[m]ember or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the Council or
Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat,
taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy
official of a [m]ember." Id. at art. 8(1).
The panelists are supposed to be selected "with a view to ensuring the independence of the
members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of experience." Id. at art.
8(2). Consequently, panelists who are not citizens of the disputing nations are clearly
preferred. See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(3).
If one of the parties is a developing country and it so requests, one of the panelists must
also be a citizen of a developing country. See id. at art. 8(10).
"3 See id. at art. 8(6).
t See Khansari, supra note 90, at 192. The panel process is laid out in DSU, supra note
82, at art. 12.
135 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(5). The request for a five-member panel has to be
made "within 10 days from the establishment of the panel." Id. "Experience has shown that
three panelists can function more efficiently than five ... [But] the input of five members
during deliberations may be more effective in resolving the dispute to the satisfaction of all."
I SWACKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 380.
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parties cannot agree within 20 days on whom to appoint, either party may
request the Director-General to choose the panelists. 136  The Director
General would then be required to do SO.1 37  Therefore, the parties lose
another possibility to block the process.
It may occur that more than one member requests a panel regarding the
same issue. In this case, the DSU recommends the establishment of only
one panel. 38  In attempting to "eliminate drawn-out disputes over the
terms of reference,"'' 39 the DSU provides for compulsory Terms of Refer-
ence in case the parties do not agree on special terms.'O Also, as a result
of the past experience under the GATT, the DSU lays down a very detailed
panel process which is "marked by legalistic underpinnings. '""' The DSU
requires the complete panel phase to be completed within six months.
42
This time frame is limited to three months in cases of urgency, and it may
exceptionally be extended up to nine months.
43
As the panel's function is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibili-
ties, the panel is required to objectively assess the case with regard to the
facts as well as the legal issues involved, and to make other findings that
support the DSB in making the appropriate rulings or recommendations.'"4
A panel is not allowed to interpret any of the provisions of the covered
agreements.1 45  During its examination of the case, the panel follows
detailed "Working Procedures."'" After fixing the time table, the panelists
receive the parties' submissions, hear their arguments, and, if necessary,
" See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(7).
137 See id. at art. 8(7).
138 See id. at art. 9(1).
39 Young, supra note 66, at 402.
'40 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 7.
'41 See Khansari, supra note 90, at 192.
142 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 12(8).
143 See id. at arts. 12(8) & (9). The DSB must be informed by the panel about the reasons
for the delay. See id. at art. 12(9).
'4See id. at art. 11.
145 See WTO Agreement, supra note 9, at art. IX(2). "The Ministerial Conference and
the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations" of the covered
agreements. Id.
'"Appendix 3 to the Understanding contains model Working Procedures that have to be
followed if the panel does not decide otherwise. See DSU, supra note 82. at art. 12(1).




request additional information. 147  In this context, the DSU provides that
the reports of experts or committees, established under some of the
agreements, may, or in some cases, shall be considered. 48 Also, the DSU
instructs the panel to hear the arguments of any member who is substantially
interested in the matter. 49 Nevertheless, the panel deliberates confidential-
ly and drafts the report in absence of the parties. 5°
An interim report containing the facts and parties' arguments as well as
the panel's own findings and conclusions is issued to the parties for
discussion with the panel.' 5 ' If not misused to interfere with the panel's
internal working, the interim review stage "surely will constitute an incentive
to more responsible reasoning and a guarantee against unpredictable
arguments,"'' 52 because the parties get another, final chance to argue before
the panel. 53  The quality of the panel and its acceptance should be
enhanced. '5
The interim report becomes final and is circulated to each member
provided that no party requests a (third) meeting with the panel. 55 After
147 See DSU, supra note 82, at arts. 8(1), 12(3)-(6). More specifically, the procedural
stage involving the parties consists of the following steps: first, the parties will submit their
written submission, then have a first meeting with the panel for oral presentations, then
submit written rebuttals, and finally meet the panel a second time. See id. at art. 12(6) app.
3(4)-(10).
The provision stipulating that the panels have the "right to seek information ... from any
individual or body" seems far-reaching, but one has to bear in mind that "the right to seek
information is not the same as the right to get information." 1 SWACKER ET AL., supra note
4, at 393.
14' See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 13(2). For a description of the use of experts in the
proceedings, see Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 91, at 131-34.
"' See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 10.
50 See id. at art. 14. For information regarding the confidentiality of information given
by an expert review group, see id. at app. 4(5).
'1 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 15(1) & (2).
152 Pescatore, supra note 61, at 35-36. Pescatore feared that "[t]he 'interim review'..
would constitute an outright intervention into the panel's independence." Kenneth W. Abbott,
The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System of Justice,
1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 111, 134 (citation omitted).
153 See David S. Huntington, Symposium on the North American Free Trade Agreement:
Settling Disputes under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 407,
422 (1993).
'5' See Abbott, supra note 152, at 135.
'55 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 15(2).
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considering the final report, the DSB adopts it between 20 and 60 days after
its issuance to the members unless either one of the disputing parties notifies
the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus against
adoption. 56 The DSB is not empowered to change the report's contents
in any way. 157 It may only accept or refuse the entire report.
c. Appeal
An appeal can only be filed by a party to the dispute, and third party
members do not have the right to appeal.' 58 However, third party state-
ments are considered by the Appellate Body. 59 There is a strict time limit
with regard to the proceedings. Normally, the period is 60 days, but in no
case is it more than 90 days. 6° Like panel proceedings, the Appellate
Body's proceedings are confidential, and the report is drafted without the
presence of the parties.' 6' Even if it has been feared that including
minority opinions weakens the "authoritative force of the reports,' ' 62 the
Appellate Body members may express their own appreciation of the case by
an individual opinion 16 3-a tradition found in common law countries.
However, these opinions are anonymous" 4 so that an Appellate Body
member cannot be accused of being biased, and "passive manipulation" with
regard to composing the Appellate Body panels will not take place.' 65 The
116 See id. at art. 16.
'" See Reitz, supra note 64, at 582.
158 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(4). This restriction enhances the similarity of the
panel proceedings with a tribunal procedure. See Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 91, at 144.
'9 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(4). As in the panel phase, a third party must have
a "substantial interest in the matter" to make written submissions and to be heard by the
Appellate Body. Id.
'60 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(5). The period is counted from the day the
disputing party notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal until the day the Appellate Body
circulates its report. Id. To some authors "these deadlines seem unrealistic in view of the
complex legal issues in many proceedings." Vermulst & Driessen, supra note 91, at 146.
161 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(10).
162 MontaiiA i Mora, supra note 67, at 152.
163 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(11).
'6 See id.
65 See Dillon, supra note 83, at 386. An active manipulation of the composition of the
Appellate Body panels is not possible since their members are not chosen by the parties. See
DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(1). Nevertheless, a party is allowed "to time its appeal, within
provided limitations, to coincide with the next rotation of Appellate Body members." Dillon,
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Appellate Body, in contrast to the DSB, has the power to "uphold, modify
or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel,"' 66 but it may
not remand the case. 67 The Appellate Body report is adopted without
amendments unless the DSB votes by consensus to the contrary within 30
days after the report's circulation to the member states.
168
d. Implementation and Enforcement of Decisions
If the panel or the Appellate Body find that the measure in question is
consistent with the agreements, and the DSB decides the same way, the
complaint will be rejected. 69 In case of an offending measure, the panel
or Appellate Body conclude their reports by recommending the accused
member state bring the measure into conformity with the concerned
agreement and proposing how to implement the recommendation. 70 After
the DSB has adopted the report, a well laid-out system with respect to
implementation and sanctions applies. As a majority of problems faced
under the GATT 1947 dispute resolution mechanism were connected with the
unwillingness of the parties to comply with the reports,' 7' three entire
articles of the DSU contain stipulations related to this question.7 7 A new
feature introduced in this context is the surveillance of the implementation
supra note 83, at 386.
166 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(13).
67 The exclusion of remanding a case is a unique limitation that probably does not exist
in any other "multitiered system of legal decision making." Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at
484.
1 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17(14).
169 See Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 181 (citing DSU, art. 3). In case of a
rejection, unilateral retaliatory actions of the member states are foreclosed. See DSU, supra
note 82, at art. 23.
170 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 19(l). For non-violation complaints, specific
procedures have been introduced; the panels and the Appellate Body are authorized to
recommend only a "mutually satisfactory adjustment." See id. at art. 26.
171 See GAT17 Dispute Settlement Stymied by Non-Implementation of Reports, FOCUS:
GATr NEWSLETTER, May-June 1991, at 1, 12-13 (Information and Media Relations Division
of GATT pubi., Geneva, Switzerland); Dispute Panels Jump from 1 to 11, FoCUS: GATT
NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 1 (Information and Media Relations Division of GATIT
publ., Geneva, Switzerland).
£7' The problem of implementation and sanctions is treated by the DSU, supra note 82,
at art. 21-23.
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of the final decision by the DSB.' Under the old system practically no
institution observed whether the members complied with the recommenda-
tions and rulings.'74 Therefore, the DSB will review the implementation
after a six month period and continuously thereafter until the issue is
completely resolved.
175
The DSU favors the withdrawal of the inconsistent measure as the best
solution. 76 It emphasizes that the effectiveness of the dispute settlement
system depends on the "[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or
rulings of the DSB.' The member is therefore given 30 days after the
adoption of the report to notify the DSB if it intends to implement the
recommendations and rulings. 78  If an immediate compliance is not
practical, a "reasonable period of time" not exceeding 15 months from the
date of the establishment of the panel shall be granted.179 If it is unclear
whether the measures undertaken to comply with the report are satisfactory,
a second procedure under the DSU shall be initiated, preferably with the
original panel. 8
0
The DSU notes that "neither compensation nor the suspension of
concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered
agreement."'' However, if the country does not comply with the report
within the given time, a graded scheme of sanctions will apply.'82 As a
" See id. at art. 21(6).
'
74 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Preface to HANDBOOK OF GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETLEMENT,
supra note 9, at viii; Young, supra note 66, at 404.
175 DSU, supra note 82, at art. 21(6).
176 Id. at art. 3(7).
171 id. at art. 21(1).
18 Id. at art. 21(3).
'79 Id. at art. 21(3). The 15 months period may be extended subject to an agreement
between the disputing parties. Id.
Three alternative ways exist to determine the "reasonable period of time": first, the
member concerned proposes it; if this proposal is not approved by the DSB the disputing
parties try to agree on it; if an agreement cannot be reached, binding arbitration will be the
last resort. Id.
"o Id. at art. 21(5).
" See id. at art. 22(1).
182 See id. at art. 22.
From an economical view point, imposing sanctions has questionable value because
"generally everyone loses when a nation takes retaliatory action. Retaliation will never be
the rule, only the exception to the rule. A single cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliations
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first possibility the disputing parties may agree on the payment of compensa-
tion. The DSU states that compensation is voluntary,'83 meaning that a
country cannot be forced to pay it. Almost nothing is said about the nature
or measure of compensation.' The parties have 20 days to reach a
satisfactory agreement regarding compensation, otherwise the DSB can be
requested to authorize the suspension of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreement." 5 The DSB has 30 days to decide the issue
by negative consensus18 6 which means that retaliatory measures are
introduced almost automatically. 8 7 The suspension should first be sought
in the same sector in which the inconsistency was found. 88 If this seems
unpractical or ineffective, suspension with regard to other sectors should be
considered.'89 If the complainant believes this to be insufficient and the
circumstances are sufficiently serious, concessions or other obligations under
another covered agreement can be suspended. 19° Of course, the level of
suspension must be equivalent to the level of the original nullification or
is enough to demonstrate an administration's political resolve, but also to incur substantial
economic harm." Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No.
24: Dispute Resolution in the New World Trade Organization: Concerns and Net Benefits,
28 INT'L LAW. 1095, 1103 (1994). Also noteworthy is the outcome of the only GATT panel
decision that allowed retaliation. In 1947, the Netherlands were authorized to impose a
60,000-ton quota on flour from the USA, but it feared that the price of bread would increase
and took no action. 1 SWACKER Er AL., supra note 4, at 377-78.
183 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(1).
l See Reitz, supra note 64, at 590.
'8 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(2).
'86 See id. at art. 22(6).
"8 One author spoke of the creation of "a regime of 'retaliation at request'." See
Montafil i Mora, supra note 67, at 156.
188 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(3)(a).
'89 See id. at art. 22(3)(b).
"g See id. at art. 22(3)(c). When the complaining party considers in which sector it will
suspend concessions and other obligations, it "shall take into account:
(i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under which the panel or
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment, and
the importance of such trade to that party;
(ii) the broader economic elements related to the nullification or impairment
and the broader economic consequences of the suspension of concessions or
other obligations."
Id. at art. 22(3)(d).
The suspension of concessions or other obligations in other sectors is known as "cross-
retaliation". Pescatore, supra note 61, at 34.
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impairment. 9' Whenever a dispute arises in terms of the level or scope
of suspension, an arbitrator shall examine the question within 60 days after
the date at which a reasonable period of time has expired. 92 Retaliatory
measures are considered only temporary until the inconsistent measure has
been removed or a "mutually satisfactory solution is reached."'
' 93
C. Criticism and Reform Proposals
Even authors who think that the more rule-oriented approach of the DSU
is a step in the right direction have expressed their discontent with some
stipulations and have suggested ways to improve the dispute settlement
system."9 The major ones will be discussed below.
One criticism is that the process is too secret and should be more
open.'95 The confidentiality of the proceedings is not favored by "many
groups whose interests are immediately and directly affected by ...
decisions" of the DSB, particularly regarding decisions involving environ-
mental matters.
96
A second major criticism targets the lack of DSU provisions prescribing
qualifications for appeals to the Appellate Body. Without a mechanism in
place to discourage frivolous appeals, the Appellate Body would be
overloaded thus delaying the adoption of the reports. 97  Therefore, a
minimum threshold for appeals, to the Appellate Body should be estab-
'9' See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(4).
'" See id. at art. 22(6). The arbitrators are either the original panel or an individual or
group appointed by the Director-General. Id.
193 See id. at art. 22(8).
'9 See Jackson, supra note 29, at 14-16; Dillon, supra note 83, at 399-402; Khansari,
supra note 90, at 195-197; MontafiA i Mora, supra note 67, at 176-180; Reitz, supra note 64,
at 598-600; Young, supra note 66, at 406-09. See also Alan Win. Wolff & John A. Ragosta,
How the Uruguay Round will change the Practice of International Trade Law in the United
States: Two Views, View One, in TuE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note 9, at 695,
701-10.
'9' See Jackson, supra note 29, at 14.
'96 See Young, supra note 66, at 406-07. Conversely one author argued that "[ilt is
difficult to conceive that serious issues of state economic policy between countries can best
be resolved in a public forum." 1 SWACKER El AL., supra note 4, at 394.




Another objection concerns the system of sanctions. It is questionable to
what extent compliance with the panel and Appellate Body rulings and
recommendations can be enforced.' 99 Termination of infringing measures
is, of course, more desirable than retaliation. 200 Furthermore, the retaliato-
ry measures only work effectively when member states of similar economic
power are involved.2"' In order to effectively render a claim of a small
and poorer country against a large and wealthier country, it has been
suggested that the WTO itself should be authorized to bring complaints and
enforce them.2°2
The extent to which the aforementioned issues will be debated on the
political level in the near future is unclear. A result of "the judicialization
of the dispute settlement system is that it will be much more difficult for the
contracting parties to reach an agreement on the substantive rules. '20 3
Pursuant to a Ministerial Decision, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is
subject to review within four years after the entry into force of the
WTO. 2°
4
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
As a point of comparison for the WTO, the North American Free Trade
Agreement will be discussed. The North American Free Trade Agreement
is "preeminently" a trade agreement. 20 5 Its main purpose is the establish-
ment of a free trade zone between Canada, Mexico and the United
States.2 6 The agreement enumerates its objectives as the elimination of
"' See id.; Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 179. It is even feared that the
overload of work would paralyze the Appellate Body. Cocuzza & Forabosco, id. Another
author sees the danger in the to-date mechanism of being "likely to encourage regular appeals,
and therefore to weaken the panel authority." Lei Wang, Some Observations on the Dispute
Settlement System in the World Trade Organization, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 173, 178 (1995).
Young, supra note 66, at 407-08.
Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 487.
201 Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 185; Khansari, supra note 90, at 196.
2 Dillon, supra note 83, at 400.
203 See Montafi& i Mora, supra note 67, at 177.
204 Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, April 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1259, 1260.
205 See Saunders, supra note 23, at 278.
206 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 101.
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trade barriers with respect to goods and services; the furthering of conditions
of fair competition; the extension of investment possibilities; the protection
of intellectual property rights; the creation of effective procedures concerning
its implementation, application, joint administration, and dispute settlement;
and the set-up of a framework for further cooperation.2 °7
A. NAFTA Institutions
The principal institution of NAFTA, the Free Trade Commission (FTC),
consists of trade ministers or their designees.2 °8 It meets at least once a
year.2' Among its functions are the supervision of NAFTA's implementa-
tion, its further elaboration, and the resolution of disputes concerning
interpretation or application. 210 The Commission also establishes commit-
tees or working groups and supervises them.2 1' Decisions of the Commis-
sion are taken by consensus.212 The FTC is assisted by a Secretariat,
which also renders support to the Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 panels to settle
disputes, and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee.2 3 The Secretariat
is composed of national sections, for which each member nation is responsi-
ble.2
14
Outside the main agreement, the parties agreed to establish a North
American Trade Secretariat in charge of coordinating the work of the
NAFTA Secretariat's national sections by, for example, translating and
207 See id. at art. 102(1). This illustrates that NAFTA covers "non-classical" areas such
as investment, telecommunications and intellectual property as well as the "classical" areas
of most trade agreements that are related to the trade in goods.
2' See id. at art. 2001. For a detailed description of the institutions established under
NAFTA and the Side Agreements, see J. Ernesto Grijalve & Patrick T. Brewer, Monitoring
and Managing North American Free Trade: The Administrative Bodies of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 1 (1994).
2 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2001(5).
20 See id. at art. 2001(1). Furthermore, the Commission "consider[s] any other matter
that may effect the operation of [the] Agreement." Id. NAFTA dispute resolution panels are
bound by the FTC's interpretations of the NAFTA provisions. See Appleton, supra note 20,
at 146.
21 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2001(3) (Committees and working groups that are
established under different provisions of the NAFTA are listed in Annex 2001.2.)
212 See id. at art. 2001(4).
213 See id. at art. 2002(1) & (3). The Secretariat also supports the wbrk of committees
and working groups established under NAFrA. id. at art. 2002(3).




B. The Side Agreements216
After signing NAFTA, the parties concluded two Side Agreements on
Environmental Cooperation and Labor Cooperation. The negotiation of these
agreements became necessary when concerns were raised in the U.S. that
NAFTA "would spur excessive environmental degradation and job loss. 217
Environmentalists feared that Mexico would serve as a "pollution ha-
ven."218  Workers were concerned that the elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, the liberalization of investment rules, and the lower labor and
environmental standards would result in a movement of U.S. capital towards
Mexico and the loss of U.S. jobs.21 9  Therefore, the Environmental and
Labor Side Agreements "were instrumental in securing passage of the
215 See Grijalve & Brewer, supra note 208, at 2, 4-5, noting that the North American
Trade Secretariat was created at the first meeting of the FTC on January 4, 1994.
216 The body of this article will only briefly address NAFTA's Side Agreements. For
more information on these agreements see Annex A.
2t7 See Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side
Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but Movement in the Right
Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71, 72 (1996). See generally Robert F. Housman, The Treatment
of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization
Efforts, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 301, 304-08 (1995); C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade
Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEo. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 76-117 (1994) (citations omitted) (presenting a detailed economic
analysis of the effects of NAFTA on labor and the environment).
2
"' See Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA 's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable
Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 460-72 (1995) (citations omitted). See also Daniel B.
Magraw, Jr., Trade Agreements, C990 ALI-ABA 193, 195-99 (1995); Kevin W. Patton,
Dispute Resolution under the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation,
5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 90-94 (1994).
29 See Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Eric Griego, The Labor Dimension of the NAFTA:
Reflections on the First Year, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 473, 475 (1995) (citations
omitted). See generally Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experience with NAFTA's
Labour Side Accord, 18 COMp. LAB. L.J. 161-163 (1997); Karen Vossler Champion, Who
Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade and International Labor Standards, 22
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 181, 225-26 (1996); Robert E. Herzstein, The Labor
Cooperation Agreement among Mexico, Canada and the United States: Its Negotiations and
Prospects, 3 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 121-25 (1995); Sarah Lowe, The First American Case under the
North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 481, 487-90 (1997).
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NAFTA [in the United States]. ' '22° At the same time, however, Mexico
feared that under a regime of free trade, environmental and labor standards
could be used as a means of protectionism.22'
Neither Side Agreement contains labor or environmental norms but rather
is a legal process.222 One of their aims is to make the countries enforce
their own labor or environmental laws.223
C. The Dispute Settlement Regimes
The North American Free Trade Agreement establishes separate dispute
resolution systems depending on the subject at stake.224 Usually, conflicts
are covered by the general dispute settlement mechanism described in
Chapter 20,2" excluding investment and related matters (Chapter 11) and
cases of antidumping and countervailing duty 226 (AD/CVD) (Chapter
0 Jorge A. Gonzalez, Jr., The North American Free Trade Agreement, 30 INT'L LAW.
345, 352 (1996).
2' See Saunders, supra note 23, at 303.
222 See Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution under the
NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 440 (1995).
223 See NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 3, 5 & 6; NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 2-4.
Under both agreements, the parties are directed to ensure that their laws provide for high
standards of environmental protection or for high labor standards, respectively, and to strive
for an improvement of those standards. See NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 2 & 3; NAALC,
supra note 25, at art. 1 & 2. The agreements also provide for the exchange of information
and cooperation between the parties. NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 1 & 10; NAALC, supra
note 25, at art. 1, 10 & 11.
224 See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 73, at 603-22. See also Kristin L. Oelstrom, A Treaty
for the Future: The Dispute Settlement Mechanisms of the NAFTA, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 783 (1994); Hector Rojas V., The Dispute Resolution Process Under NAFTA, 1 U.S.-
MEX. L.J. 19 (1993); Andrew Kayumi Rosa, Old Wine, New Skins: NAFTA and the
Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 255, 260-283
(1993); Jose Luis Siqueiros, NAFTA Institutional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 383 (1993); Louis B. Sohn, Comments on Dispute
Resolution, 1 U.S.-MEX. LJ. 31 (1993).
m See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2003-22.
26 "[D]umping is ... a form of price discrimination [that] occurs when foreign buyers
are charged lower prices than domestic buyers for an identical product." ROBERT J.
CARBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 112 (2d ed., 1985).
Also with the intention to protect the domestic industry, countervailing duties are applied
to goods that are produced with the aid of a foreign subsidy.
For a very detailed and critical analysis of U.S. and WTO AD and CVD provisions, see
BHALA, supra note 36, at 601-842.
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19),227 for which particular provisions are in place. 228  Both the Environ-
mental and the Labor Side Agreements also set up separate dispute resolution
mechanisms, but they are very similar to the Chapter 20 system.229
1. Experiences Under CFTA
Generally stated, the scattered conflict settlement procedures of NAFTA
reflect the system that has already been in existence under CFTA.23 °
CFTA provided a general framework for settling disputes in Chapter 18,
excepting financial services23' and AD/CVD cases, 232 for which a special
arrangement existed.
Chapter 18 created the Canada-U.S. Trade Commission, which was
bilaterally composed of cabinet-level representatives.23 3 The Commission
facilitated consultations and negotiations between parties when a dispute
arose.2 34  If these efforts remained unsuccessful, the Commission would
establish a panel of experts.235 Three types of panel proceedings were
227 NAFrA, supra note 20, at art. 2004.
228 For investment disputes, see NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1101-39 & Annexes; for
AD/CVD cases, see id. at art. 1901-11 & Annexes. Chapter 11 will not be discussed because
it deals with disputes between a private investor and the country of investment. See id. at art.
1115 & 1116.
229 NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 22-36; NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 27-41.
230 Rojas V., supra note 224, at 19. See Judith H. Bello et al., U.S. Trade Law and Policy
Series No. 18: Midterm Report on Binational Dispute Settlement under the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, 25 INT'L LAW. 489 (1991); J.G. Castel, The Settlement of
Disputes under the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
118 (1989); William C. Graham, Dispute Resolution in the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, 37 MCGILL L.J. 544 (1992); Robert Hage, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 1990 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 361; Ted L. McDorman, The
Dispute Settlement Regime of the Free Trade Agreement, 2 REV. INT'L Bus. 303 (1988);
Joseph A. McKinney, Dispute Settlement under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 8
J. INT'L ARB. 89 (1991); T. Bradbrooke Smith, Comments on Dispute Resolution under a
North American Free Trade Agreement, 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 337 (1987).
231 The agreement stipulates clearly that "[n]o other provision ... confers rights or
imposes obligations on the [p]arties with respect to financial services." CFTA, supra note
21, at art. 1701(1).
232 Chapter 19 contains the dispute settlement system for AD/CVD cases.
233 See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 18, art. 1802.
234 See id. at ch. 18, art. 1802(1), 1805.
235 See id. at ch. 18, art. 1807(2). The panels established under Chapter 18 and 19
consisted of five persons. See id. at ch. 18, art. 1807(3) & Annex 1901.2(2).
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possible: the first was binding arbitration in safeguard cases236 and in
cases when the governments mutually agreed,237 and the second was panel
recommendations.238 In the third case, the Commission would try to find
an agreement in order to achieve a final resolution of the dispute.239 If the
disagreement continued, the party whose rights were being infringed upon
was entitled to retaliation until a resolution was found.24
The system installed by Chapter 19 in connection with AD/CVD cases
was unusual.24' CFTA did not contain any stipulation in terms of harmo-
nizing AD and CVD laws; instead, every country continued to apply its own
national law.242 A party could request the establishment of a panel to
review either an AD or a CVD statutory amendment, or the AD/CVD
decisions of a national authority (instead of a review by a national
court).243 In the latter case, the panel had to apply the standard of review
and general legal principles of the importing country. 244  The panel
236 See id. at ch. 11, art. 1103.
237 See id. at ch. 18, art. 1806(1). No panels came together under articles 1103 or 1806,
so they did not play any role in practice. See Harry B. Endsley, Dispute Settlement under the
CFTA and NAFTA: From Eleventh-hour Innovation to Accepted Institution, 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 659, 666 n.34 (1995).
238 See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 18, art. 1807.
239 See id. at ch. 18, art. 1807(8).
240 See id. at ch. 18, art. 1807(9).
241 See William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 21, at 173, 177.
242 See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 19, art. 1902(1). The U.S. and Canada were not able
to agree on harmonizing their AD/CVD laws "despite, for example, their common intention
at the start of the negotiations to develop a new body of rules regulating government
subsidization." BELLO ET AL., supra note 230, at 494. Therefore they established a working
group to take care of the matter. See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 19, art. 1907. The fate
of this Working Group remains an open question because "[t]here has been very little activity
by [it]." PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT: SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 108 (1993). For the negotiating history of the
CFTA, see BELLO ET AL., supra note 230, at 493-95; WINHAM, supra note 21, at 23-42.
243 See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 19, art. 1903, 1904.
244 See id. at ch. 19, art. 1904(3). This method of AD/CVD review has been chosen
because it promised an objective and fair application of the national laws in the politically
sensitive field of antidumping and subsidies. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute
Settlement under Chapter 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: An Interim
Appraisal, 24 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 269, 270 (1991).
It seems that Canada and the U.S. were not sure whether this new mechanism would fulfill
their expectations because its application was limited to five years (CFTA, supra note 21, at
[Vol. 27:57
WTO AND NAFTA
decisions were binding on the parties.245 An appeal was not possible, but
the agreement provided for an "Extraordinary Challenge Procedure" 246
designed for "issues of impropriety which bring the entire system of panel
review into question. 247
Generally, CFTA dispute settlement system worked "extraordinarily well,"
with the Chapter 19 process being more successful than the Chapter 18
process.24s It was considered that in both sets of procedures, qualified
panelists fulfilled their task well by maintaining a high level of knowledge
and expertise, issuing well-thought-out decisions, respecting nevertheless the
strict time limits set by CFTA, and not dividing along national lines.249
Most of the panel decisions seem to be well accepted.2 0 Also, compliance
ch. 19, art. 1906), but at the end of those five years, the NAFrA was signed. See NAFTA,
supra note 20.
245 See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 19, art. 1904(9).
246 See id. at ch. 19, art. 1904(13) & Annex 1904(13).
247 Appleton, supra note 20, at 140. This safeguard mechanism, which consisted of a
three-member committee of Canadian and U.S. judges or former judges, was accessible but
under very restricted conditions. See CFTA, supra note 21, at ch. 19, art. 1904(13) & Annex
1904(13)(1). In the only two challenges filed, the Committee unanimously upheld the original
panels' decisions. See Huntington, supra note 153, at 437.
28 See Lowenfeld, supra note 244, at 334.
249 See Bello et al., supra note 230, at 516; Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 31-32;
Endsley, supra note 237, at 675; Huntington, supra note 153, at 414; Johnson, supra note 20,
at 520; Lowenfeld, supra note 244, at 334; Homer E. Moyer, Chapter 19 of the NAFTA:
Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707, 726 (1993); James
Holbein, U.S. FrA Secretary, Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures under the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement, Panel Discussion (April 23, 1991), in 24 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 341, 349 (1991).
One scholar noted that "the panelists have been thoughtful; their opinions have been
thorough and articulate, and their conclusions on the whole persuasive. Taking all the cases
together one could not detect a bias in favor of protectionism of unrestricted trade ..
Lowenfeld, supra note 244, at 334.
m An "exception" seems to be the "Softwood Lumber III" case, which was "the first
dispute in which both the binational panel and the extraordinary challenge committee divided
along national lines." Charles M. Gastle & Jean-G. Castel, Q.C., Should the North American
Free Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Cases Be Reformed in the Light of Softwood Lumber 111?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
823, 823-24 (1995). See also Zsolt K. Bessko, Note, CFTA-NAFTA Dispute Resolution on
the Rocks?: The Softwood Lumber Case, 15 J.L. & CoM. 335 (1995); JOHNSON, supra note
20, at 520.
For criticism and reform proposals see Bello et al., supra note 230, at 515-16; John Moss,
Summary of Proceedings of the Seminar on Dispute Resolution under the Canada-United
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with the decision did not constitute a problem.25' A sign that even
politicians appreciated the panel's work is that CFTA rules for the general
procedure and the AD/CVD procedure were carried over into NAFTA with
only minor changes.252
2. The General Dispute Settlement Mechanism
NAFTA opens up an interesting option for a complaining party: when a
dispute arises under both the provisions of NAFTA and GATT, the
complaining party may select either forum for settlement. 253  Once the
procedures have started under one forum, generally the other one is
excluded.254 On the other hand, a party can enforce NAFTA provisions
against another party only by the means described in NAFTA itself, not in
domestic courts.255
"To promote efficiency" the complete Chapter 20 process is marked by
time limits that allow the parties to find a resolution within eight
States Free Trade Agreement, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 153, 176-79, 189-91, 195-97 (1989).
Proposals that were made in order to enhance the dispute resolution process included the
participation of private parties, the reduction of the number of different procedures, and the
creation of a North American Trade Tribunal that "should have jurisdiction with respect to
disputes involving the interpretation and application of the North American Free Trade
Agreement." Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, American Bar
Association Section of International Law and Practice Reports to the House of Delegates, 26
INT'L LAW. 855, 857, 859-60, 863 (1992).
" See Gary N. Horlick & F. Amanda DeBusk, Dispute Resolution Panel of the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement: The First Two and One-half Years, 37 McGILL L.J. 575, 581
(1992); see Huntington, supra note 153, at 436; Gary N. Horlick, The U.S.-Canada FTA and
GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures-The Litigant's View, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 11 (1992)
(quoting Clara Hills, former U.S. Trade Representative).
252 See Gilbert R. Winham, Dispute Settlement in NAFTA and the FTA, in ASSESSING
NAFTA: A TRINATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 20, 251, 253.
For the differences between CFTA and NAFTA dispute settlement provisions, see James
R. Holbein & Gray Carpentier, Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the
Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 531, 560-65 (1993); Rojas, supra note
224, at 19; Rosa, supra note 224, at 260-83.
" See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2005. This option has already existed under the
CFTA (CFTA art. 1801(2)). For certain matters the parties may only have recourse to the
NAFTA provisions. See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2005(3) & (4).
2 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2005(6); see also id. at art. 2005(2) (regarding the
involvement of a third party).





The resolution of a conflict under Chapter 20, i.e. with regard to NAFTA
except AD/CVD and investment cases, begins with consultations. 257 The
Agreement requests that the parties "make every attempt to arrive at a
mutually satisfactory resolution ... through consultations,"5 8 thus "clearly
emphasiz[ing] the prevention of disputes in the first instance or -their
cooperative resolution through consultations. '259 Thus, it can be said that
"the underlying principle of Chapter 20 is that of amicable agreement."
26°
A third party that believes it has a substantial interest in the matter can
participate in the consultations.26'
256 id.
257 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2006(1). A party can initiate the Chapter 20
mechanism in three situations: when a dispute exists with regard to the interpretation or
application of the agreement, when a party believes "that an actual or proposed measure of
another [p]arty is or would be inconsistent with" the agreement, or when a party considers
such a measure to cause nullification or impairment of a benefit that it could have reasonably
expected under many NAFTA provisions. See id. at art. 2004 & Annex 2004. One author
has it called a "step backward" that the CFI'A provision requiring the notification of proposed
measures which could negatively effect the agreement is left out in NAFTA. See Rojas,
supra note 224, at 21.
2"8 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2006(5). The CFTA, however, did not contain a
similar provision. See Rojas, supra note 224, at 20. It has been noted that this "new
provision constitut[es] an international obligation of the three parties." Id.
2"9 Endsley, supra note 237, at 663. See also Winham, supra note 252, at 266. But is
not clear whether many disputes will be settled by consultations. "As of December 1996,
only eight disputes formally entered the Chapter 20 consultations phase." David Lopez,
Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from Early Experience, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 163,
168 (1997). "Chapter 20 consultations could be credited with resolving only one of these
eight controversies. . . . Consultations failed to resolve five other conflicts ... [They]
formally advanced to the second dispute settlement stage, a meeting of the Free Trade
Commission." Id. at 170-71.
o See Siqueiros, supra note 224, at 387. It is noteworthy that NAFIA eliminated
binding arbitration which CFTA required in certain instances. See Siqueiros, supra note 224,
at 385. "Although this elimination seems a bold stroke, the change is not of great practical
importance... [because] neither arbitration process has been used at all under [CFrA], and
there is no reason to believe there would be a great demand for them under NAFTA." Rosa,
supra note 224, at 285.
26' See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2006(3).
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b. Special Commission Meeting
If the parties are not able to reach an accord within 45 days any party may
ask the Free Trade Commission for a meeting, 62 which is required to take
place within the following ten days.263 In order to assist the parties in
finding a solution, the Commission can employ good offices, conciliation and
other similar mechanisms, call on technical experts, establish working
groups, and make recommendations. 26
c. Panel Phase
If the parties still disagree, either can request to set up a panel 30 days
after the Commission's meeting.265 A third party that has a substantial
interest in the matter is entitled to join as a complaining party.2°  The
Agreement stipulates that "the Commission shall establish an arbitral
panel. '267 Despite consensus being required for decision making,26 "the
mandatory nature of the language suggests that the representatives of the
three [p]arties are legally bound to approve the establishment of the
panel. 269 This means that the requesting party has, in fact, a right to a
panel.270  A panel consists of five persons, usually chosen from a pre-
established roster of "individuals who are willing and able to serve as
262 See id. at art. 2007(1). The regular period is 30 days from the delivery of request for
consultations; it is limited to 15 days when perishable agricultural goods are involved, and
extended to 45 days if another party has asked for or participated in consultations on the same
matter. Id.
263 See id. at art. 2007(4).
264 See NAIFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(4) & (5). The NAFTA text asks the
Commission to use "good offices, conciliation, mediation or such other dispute resolution
procedures" to resolve the dispute. NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(5)(b). Thus, one
could assume that the "Commission may choose to refer a dispute to arbitration as simply
another means" of alternative dispute resolution. See Huntington, supra note 153, at 418.
265 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2008(l).
266 See id. at art. 2008(3).
267 See id. at art. 2008(2).
268 See id. at art. 2001(4).
2 See Huntington, supra note 153, at 419.270 See Samuel S. Straight, GATT and NAFTA: Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and
the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DuKE L.J. 216, 226 (1995) (citation omitted).
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panelists."27' In case of a two-party dispute, the parties have 15 days to
agree on the chair of the panel; otherwise one of the disputing parties
selected by lot nominates the chair. The chair must not be a citizen of that
party.272 Within the next 15 days each party chooses two citizens of the
other party as panelists 273-a so-called "reverse selection process
' 274
which ensures impartiality.275 If no panelist is chosen before the deadline,
the selection will be done by lot. 276 For a three-party dispute, the Agree-
ment slightly modifies the method of selection.277 It has been observed
that the possibility for a party to block the selection process is very
271 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2009(1), 2011(1). The individuals listed in the
roster have to meet certain requirements; they "shall:
(a) have expertise or experience in law, international trade, other matters
covered by this Agreement or the resolution of disputes arising under
international trade agreements, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of
objectivity, reliability and sound judgment;
(b) be independent of, and not be affiliated with or take instructions from,
any [plarty; and
(c) comply with a code of conduct to be established by the Commission."
Id. at art. 2009(2), 2010(1).
A non-roster individual may be nominated as a panelist as well, but he or she is subject to
a peremptory challenge from another disputing party. See id. at art. 2011(3).
272 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2011(1)(b). Even if the system works well
theoretically, some obstacles occurred during its practical application. The experience of the
only dispute that reached the panel phase (as of December 1996) reveals these obstacles.
"Although four panelists were selected by early October 1995, the parties experienced
substantial difficulty in agreeing upon a fifth panelist, the chairperson. Canada and the United
States finally agreed on a chairman ... in January 1996." Lopez, supra note 259, at 172
(citations omitted). It seems that in this case neither the deadlines were respected nor was
the stipulated procedure (selection by lot) followed.
273 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 201 l(l)(c).
274 See JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 523; see also Holbein & Carpentier, supra note 252,
at 562.
275 See Endsley, supra note 237, at 682.
276 See NAFI'A, supra note 20, at art. 2011(1)(d).
7 In case of three-party disputes, the parties have to agree on the chair; if they are unable
to do so within 15 days, "the [p]arty or [p]arties on the side of the dispute chosen by lot shall
select within 10 days a chair who is not a citizen of such [p]arty ... [Tihe [plarty complained
against shall select two panelists, one of whom is a citizen of a complaining [p]arty, and the
other of whom is a citizen of another complaining [plarty. The complaining [plarties shall
select two panelists who are citizens of the [p]arty complained against." Id. at art. 201 l(2)(b)
& (c).
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limited-a situation which promotes the integrity of the settlement sys-
tem.
278
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the panel has to follow Model Rules
of Procedure set up by the Commission as well as the Terms of Reference
laid down in the Agreement.27 9 Pursuant to the latter ones, the panel has
to examine the factual and legal aspects of the case.8 With respect to
information or technical advice, the panel may question any person or body
deemed appropriate if the disputing parties so agree.28 ' Furthermore, the
Agreement provides for a written report by a scientific review board for any
scientific matter if so requested by a party or initiated by the panel (unless
a party objects).282
Third parties are authorized to participate in the hearings and make
submissions to the panel.283 Nevertheless, the entire panel proceedings
except the final report must be confidential.2"
278 See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 73, at 617.
279 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2012(1)-(3). NAFTA enumerates several principles
that have to be included in the Model Rules of Procedure: the right for at least one hearing
before the panel; "the opportunity to provide initial and rebuttal written submissions;" and
confidentiality during most of the procedure. See id. at art. 2012(1). The Model Rules of
Procedures are a new concept that has not existed under the CFTA. See Siqueiros, supra note
224, at 386.
o See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2012(3), 2016(2).
281 See id. at art. 2014.
282 See id. at art. 2015(1). It is stipulated that the board consists of "highly qualified,
independent experts" selected by the panel. See id. at art. 2015(2). The provision that
"panels may ... solicit reports from scientific review boards on issues concerning
environmental, health, safety or other scientific measures.., was obviously designed to meet
criticism from the environmental lobby, but it apparently fell short of the demands of the
lobby." Winham, supra note 252, at 258 (citation omitted).
283 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2013.
2 See id. at art. 2012(l)(b).
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A time limit of 90 days starting after the selection of the last panelist is
set for the panel to produce an interim report which includes factual findings,
legal determinations, recommendations, and the report of a scientific review
board, if one has been established." 5 Separate opinions may be drafted on
matters to which there has been no unanimous agreement, but the identity of
their authors remains undiscovered. 86 Thus protests with respect to a
possible national bias are avoided, and the integrity of the process is
ensured.287
Within 14 days a disputing party may comment on the initial report; such
comment may lead the panel to make further inquiries and reconsider its
report. 288  Thirty days after presenting the initial report, the panel must
issue its final report including anonymous separate opinions and reports of
scientific review boards. 289  "Panels will only issue determinations and
recommendations, and not arbitral awards. 29 °
d. Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
Once the final report has been issued, -it is up to the parties to find a
resolution to the dispute, "which normally shall conform with the determina-
tions and recommendations of the panel, 291 although conformity is not a
requirement. 292 Nevertheless, even a non-binding panel report has a certain
285 See id. at art. 2015(4), 2016(1) & (2). The possible advantages or disadvantages of
this interim review stage are the same as already described for the WTO, see supra p. 85 &
n.152-54. For the experience made with regard to the deadlines, see infra note 289.
2 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2016(3), 2017(2).
287 See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 73, at 617-18.
288 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2016(4) & (5).
289 See id. at art. 2017(1)-(3). The final report shall be transmitted to the Commission.
See id. at art. 2017(3). In the only case that had reached the panel phase (as of December
1996), the deadlines for the initial and the final report were not respected. "Pursuant to
NAFTA Articles 2016 and 2017, the panel should have issued an initial report on the dispute
by no later than April 1996 ... and a final report by no later than May 1996 ...
Nevertheless, the panel did not present an initial report ... until July 1996 and a final report
until December 1996." Lopez, supra note 259, at 172-73 (citations omitted).
290 Siqueiros, supra note 224, at 386.
291 NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2018(1).
292 Consequently, one author has observed that "[iun terms of sovereign discretion ... the
[p]arties will have little to lose by resorting to panel adjudication". See Huntington, supra
note 153, at 426.
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influence on the disputing parties.293 When the report finds that the
measure in question causes an infringement, the Agreement proposes either
non-implementation or removal of that measure or compensation as possible
solutions .2
If the parties are unable to agree on a solution or if no compensation is
offered within the 30 days following the receipt of the final report, the
complaining party is allowed to apply sanctions, i.e. to "suspend the
application ... of benefits of equivalent effect. ' ' 295 The use of retaliatory
measures can be regarded as an "automatic right" because no further
authorization is needed.2% But this retaliation (and its temporal limitation)
is the "same sanction that customary international law would provide to the
offended party even in the absence of an arbitration procedure. 297  The
suspension must first be sought in the sector or sectors affected.298 If the
complaining party believes this to be impracticable or ineffective, it can
suspend benefits in other sectors.299 The application of sanctions has to be
discontinued when a mutually agreed upon solution to the dispute is
found.3°°
In addition, the parties' actions during the implementation phase are not
monitored by any NAFTA institution. °" But should any party believe that
293 See 0. Thomas Johnson, Jr., Alternative Dispute Resolution in the International
Context: The North American Free Trade Agreement, 46 SMU L. REV. 2175, 2180-81
(1993). "Even though an arbitrator's report may not be viewed as binding, it radically alters
the relative positions of the parties to the dispute. It does this by stating who is right and
who is wrong, thereby changing the question at issue. With a report in hand, the question
becomes not whether a particular action violated the agreement but, if it did, whether the
offending party takes the agreement seriously ... Moreover, as a basis for retaliation, a
nonbinding opinion is virtually the equivalent of a binding one, particularly when the
agreement expressly authorizes retaliation in cases of non-compliance." Id. at 2180-82
(citation omitted).
2 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2018(2). Under the CFTA it was mainly the
Commission's task to agree on the resolution of a dispute after the issuance of the final
report. See CFTA, supra note 21, at art. 1807(8).
29' See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2019(1). With respect to the economic effect of
sanctions, see supra note 182.
' See Huntington, supra note 153, at 425.
2 See Johnson, supra note 293, at 2181.
298 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2019(2)(a).
29 See id. at art. 2019(2)(b).
100 See id. at art. 2019(1).
301 See Michael Barber, NAFTA Dispute Resolution Provisions: Leaving Room for
Abusive Tactics by Airlines Looking Southward, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 991, 999 (1996).
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the "level of benefits suspended by a [p]arty ... is manifestly excessive,"
the Commission establishes a panel to investigate the issue.3"2 The
effectiveness of this provision has been questioned because the reviewing
panel only makes recommendations, whereas any action has to be taken by
the disputing parties or the FTC, and "[s]ince the [plarty levying 'manifestly
excessive' sanctions will necessarily be a member of both groups, it will be
able to block any action because both bodies act by consensus. ' '303
3. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
The parties that negotiated NAFTA were unable to agree on harmonized
rules and standards regulating the investigation and imposition of antidump-
ing and countervailing duties. 3°4 Therefore, as was the rule under CFTA,
every country keeps its own AD and CVD laws. 305 NAFTA also provides
a formal mechanism for resolving disputes involving the review of statutory
amendments to the parties' laws 3° and for the review of final AD and
CVD duty determinations made by the relevant national authorities.3 7
"[P]roblems that may arise with respect to the implementation or operation
302 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2019(3), (4).
33 See Rosa, supra note 224, at 286.
3o4 See JAMES R. CANNON, JR., RESOLVING DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 19 169-70
(1994); Debra P. Steger, Dispute Settlement, in TRADE-OFFS ON FREE TRADE, supra note 21,
182, 183. "Both Canada and Mexico (like Canada in the 1988 FTA talks) wanted to use the
NAFTA negotiations to win substantial relief from the U.S. AD and CVD laws. The United
States, in contrast, was not prepared to accept any substantive weakening of its trade laws."
PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, supra note 242, at 107. For an overview of the
parties' different aims during the negotiations, see CANNON, supra, at 167-68, and Oelstrom,
supra note 224, at 793-96, 804-05.
30' See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1902(1). Consequently, one author has called this
principle the "cornerstone of dispute resolution under Chapter 19." CANNON, supra note 304,
at 7. Unlike CFTA, NAFTA "has no sunset provision limiting the continuation of the Chapter
19 binational process, and it drops the working party established in [C]FTA to develop
different rules for subsidies and antidumping procedures." Winham, supra note 252, at 266.
"'The absence of a NAFTA Working Group or any required studies of the AD/CVD issue
might result from the U.S. position that this issue should only be addressed in the context of
the GATT." PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, supra note 242, at 108. One author
has criticized NAFTA because it does not contain any provision dealing with the harmoniza-
tion of AD and CVD laws. See Huntington, supra note 153, at 441.
3o See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1903.
"7 See id. at art. 1904.
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of... Chapter [19]" are to be solved by annual consultations. 308 Further-
more, Chapter 19 requires the parties to adapt their laws to the NAFTA
provisions according to a schedule.3 9 It also obliges any party to notify
the others if it amends its AD or CVD laws.310
a. Review Of Statutory Amendments
An amendment to one party's AD or CVD law may undergo a review by
a two-nation panel if another party suspects that these amendments violate
the WTO Antidumping Agreement or the object and purpose of NAFTA,
irrespective of the amendment having the "function and effect of overturning
a prior [panel] decision" regarding AD and CVD duties.3 '
See id. at art. 1907(1).
30 See id. at art. 1904(15) & Annex 1904.15. All three parties are required to alter their
laws, but most of the changes have to be made by Mexico. See CANNON, supra note 304,
at 88, 95-100.
310 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1902(2). Consultations prior to the enactment of
the amendment can be requested. See id. at art. 1902(2)(c).
It became a necessity to include a special chapter that contains "more elaborate procedures
for dispute resolution of matters concerning the imposition of antidumping and countervailing
duties" than Chapter 20 because as a result of "the reduction and elimination of tariffs and
non-tariff barriers under the NAFT7A, it may be expected that the [p]arties will more
frequently resort to AD and CVD measures in reaction to trade friction." CANNON, supra
note 304, at 4, 5.
311 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1903(1). The panel analyzes whether
(a) the amendment does not conform to the provisions of Article 1902(2)(d)(i)
or (ii); or
(b) such amendment has the function and effect of overturning a prior decision
of a panel [with respect to final antidumping and countervailing duty
determinations by national authorities] and does not conform to the provisions
of Article 1902(2)(d)(i) or (ii).
Id.
Article 1902(2)(d) requires an amendment to an AD or CVD law not to be "inconsistent
with
(i) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA'T), the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(the Antidumping Code) or the Agreement on the Interpretation and
Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (the Subsidies Code), or any successor agreement to which
all the original signatories to this Agreement are party, or
(ii) the object and purpose of this Agreement and this Chapter, which is to
establish fair and predictable conditions for the progressive liberalization of
[Vol. 27:57
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The five panelists, of whom the majority "shall be lawyers in good
standing," are to be chosen from a roster established by the parties in
advance.312 The qualification requirements for the panelists have been
questioned, because, while the condition that they be experts in trade law is
laudable, "their expertise does not necessarily imbue them with judicial
qualities. 313  Consulting with the other party involved, each disputing
party has 30 days to nominate two candidates.' 4  It has to propose
alternative candidates if its opponent exercises its right to four preemptory
challenges within 45 days after the request to establish a panel. 315  The
selection process is designed to encourage the selection of fair panelists.3" 6
If one of the deadlines is not met the missing candidate is chosen by lot.317
The parties are required to agree on a fifth panelist within 55 days of the
request for a panel.318 If no agreement can be reached, the drawing of lots
trade between the [p]arties to this Agreement while maintaining effective and
fair disciplines on unfair trade practices, such object and purpose to be
ascertained from the provisions of this Agreement, its preamble and objec-
tives, and the practices of the [p]arties.
Id. at art. 1902(d).
312 Id. at art. 1901(2), Annex 1901.2(1), (2). It is stipulated that "[tihe roster shall include
judges or former judges to the fullest extent practicable." Id. at Annex 1901.2(1). This
provision, which was not contained in CFTA, was added at the request of the United States
"expressing the view that panels containing judges are less likely to create an independent
jurisprudence in AD and CVD cases than would otherwise be the case." See Endsley, supra
note 237, at 684 (citation omitted). The change was appreciated insofar that "panelists with
a judicial background will help ensure that the panels apply the proper standard of review and
directly follow the appropriate countervailing duty of anti-dumping laws." Bessko, supra note
250, at 353.
The Agreement requires "all candidates [on the roster to] be citizens of Canada, Mexico
or the United States. Candidates shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and
shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general
familiarity with international trade law. Candidates shall not be affiliated with a [p]arty, and
in no event shall a candidate take instructions from a [p]arty." NAFTA, supra note 20, at
Annex 1901.2(1).
313 Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade Agreements and the Federal Courts: Emerging Issues,
27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 363 (1996).
114 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1901.2(2). The Agreement allows also persons
who are not on the roster, but who fulfill the criteria named in Annex 1901.2(1) to be
nominated as candidates.
315 id.
316 Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 31.
317 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1901.2(2).
318 See id. at Annex 1901.2(3).
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will determine which party is to select the fifth panelist." 9 Like the
appointment of the chairman, the panel takes all decisions by majority
vote.320
To conduct the review of statutory amendments, the panel establishes rules
of procedure.321 The panel conducts its deliberations in confidentiality.
322
Based upon the parties' hearings and submissions, the panel issues an "initial
written declaratory opinion containing findings of fact and its determina-
tions" within 90 days of the appointment of the chairman.32 3  The panel
may recommend appropriate modifications to the amendments if it has found
a violation of the said provisions.324
A time limit of 14 days is set for the parties to object to the initial report;
otherwise it becomes final.32  In case of an objection, the panel has 30
days to reconsider its initial report and to re-examine the issue. 326  The
panel must present its "final opinion" which might, like the initial report,
include dissenting and concurring opinions.327
The panel's report is not binding on the parties but just declaratory.328
Therefore, if the panel makes recommendations, the parties are to start
consultations immediately with the aim of arriving at a "mutually satisfactory
solution ... within 90 days. '329 The complaining party may resort to self-
help if within nine months following the end of the consultations, no
modifications to the amendment have been made and no other agreement has
319 id.
31 See id. at Annex 1901.2(5). The five panelists select a chairman "from among the
lawyers on the panel by majority vote [; otherwise] by lot.. ." Id. at Annex 1901.2(4).
321 See id. at art. 1903(2) & Annex 1903.2(1). This and some of the following provisions
may be altered if the parties to the dispute agree so. See id. at Annex 1903.2(1), (2), (5) &
(6), for instance.
According to the Agreement "[tihe procedure shall ensure a right to at least one hearing
before the panel, as well as the opportunity to provide written submissions and rebuttal
arguments." Id. at Annex 1903.2(1).
322 See id. at Annex 1903.2(1).
323 See id. at Annex 1903.2(1) & (2).
324 See id. at Annex 1903.2(3).
325 See id. at Annex 1903.2(3) & (4).
326 See id. at Annex 1903.2(4).
327 See id. at Annex 1901.2(5), Annex 1903.2(4). The introduction of dissenting or
concurring opinions in the panel's decision results from the common law background of
Canada and the United States.
321 See id. at art. 1903(1); Annex 1903.2(4).
329 See id. at art. 1903(3)(a).
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been reached.330 Self-help consists of either the enactment of "comparable
legislative or equivalent executive action" or the termination of the
Agreement regarding the violating party.33'
b. Review of Final AD and CVD Determinations
Although the NAFTA parties could not agree on harmonizing their AD
and CVD laws, at least they replaced the review of national AD and CVD
duties by national courts with a review by independent binational panels.332
Such panels are considered to be less biased than the national courts.333
Moreover, the panels use simpler procedures334 and act more expeditiously
than national courts.335
i. Panel Phase
Once a final determination concerning the application of an AD or CVD
duty for goods of a NAFTA party has been published in the official journal
of the importing party, the exporting party has 30 days to request the
establishment of a panel.336 The selection of the panelists and the estab-
lishment of the panel is carried out exactly the same way as for the panels
3 See id. at art. 1903(3)(b).
331 Id.
332 See id. at art. 1904(1). Once a party has chosen the panel procedure, a national
judicial review is excluded. See id. at art. 1904(11).
331 See Johnson, supra note 293, at 2185. See also Deyling, supra note 313, at 359-60.
As two authors noted, "[t]here is a need to control the exercise of the broad discretion granted
to administrative tribunals by the complex web of domestic trade laws." Gastle & Castel,
supra note 250, at 829.
334 See Robert E. Burke & Brian F. Walsh, NAFTA Binational Panel Review: Should it
be Continued, Eliminated or Substantially Changed?, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 529, 533-34
(1995).
a33 See CANNON, supra note 304, at 35, 44; Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 30.
336 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(1); 1904(4) & (14). If the final determina-
tions are not published in the official journal, the Agreement directs the importing party to
notify its counterpart. See id. at art. 1901(4). The time limit has to be strictly observed,
because "[flailure to request a panel within the time specified in this paragraph shall preclude
review by a panel." Id.
To get an overview of the Canadian, Mexican and U.S. AD and CVD procedures, see
JOHNSON & SCHACHTER, supra note 21, at 525-31.
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to review amendments to AD and CVD laws.337
The panel carries out its investigation pursuant to the rules of procedure
established by the parties. 338  The rules include a tight time schedule
because the goal is to have a final decision within 315 days of the request
for the panel. 339  The panel inspects the record of the national authority
that imposed the duty, receives briefs and reply briefs of the parties, and
hears their oral arguments.40 These proceedings are limited to 195 to 210
days.4 Because this timetable is the same as under CFTA, NAFTA
AD/CVD panels are likewise expected to "issue prompt decisions. ' 32 The
panel determines whether the imposition of the duty was correct under the
national law of the importing party. 3  It has to "apply the standard of
review . . . and the legal principles that a court of the importing [p]arty
otherwise would apply."'  With respect to the qualifications of the
panelists, it has been asked whether the requirement of being an expert in
trade law is sufficient to conduct such a judicial review, since "non-judge
panelists may lack expertise in [the other party's] administrative law" and
117 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2) (requiring that panels be established in
accordance with Annex 1901.2). See also id. at Annex 1901.2 (providing procedures for
establishment and selection of panel).
31 See id. at art. 1904(6) & (14). The Agreement prescribes in very meticulous manner
what provisions have to be contained in the rules of procedure. It seems that the negotiating
parties were very eager not to leave anything unsaid as AD and CVD law is a highly
politicized area.
See id. at art. 1904(14).
34o Id. The Agreement confers on the national authority that applied the AD or CVD duty
"the right to appear and be represented by counsel before the panel." See id. at art. 1904(7).
34 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(14). "[T]he rules [of procedure] ... shall
allow: ...
(b) 30 days for designation or certification of the administrative record and its
filings with the panel;
(c) 60 days for the complainant to file its brief;
(d) 60 days for the respondent to file its brief;
(e) 15 days for the filing of reply briefs;
(f) 15 to 30 days for the panel to convene and hear oral argument...
Id. at art. 1904(14).
342 Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 29. The authors consider that "[tihe many
interim deadlines prevent the panels from falling behind schedule." Id.
343 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(1) & (2).
3 Id. at art. 1904(3); Annex 1911. For an overview of the different standards of review
in Canadian, Mexican and U.S final determinations, see CANNON, supra note 304, at 61-75;
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 532-33.
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they "may have little expertise in the art of judging."'34  Others have
feared that interpretations of the standard of review might develop differently
between the panels and the courts.' Interestingly, the same arguments
have been brought forth against CFTA panels, which, however, worked well
and did not exceed their competence. 347 Likewise, there are no indications
why the system should not work well under NAFTA.
The panel is given 90 days to write and issue its report.348 Only the
panelists take part in the confidential deliberations. 349  The panel's deci-
3 See Deyling, supra note 313, at 364-67. On the other hand, "[t]o such panelists issues
that may be arcane to lawyers or judges not specialized in the complex field of trade law are
readily understandable. This level of expertise, not always available in an appellate court, can
both inform the panel and serve as an important check on counsel." Moyer, supra note 249,
at 714.
' See Burke & Walsh, supra note 334, at 541-44 (discussing Canadian and Mexican
standards of review); see also CANNON, supra note 304, at 35, 50.
" See supra p. 97-98. "At the outset of the [CFTA], some commentators predicted that
a distinctive body of binational law would emerge in spite of the different standards ... The
hope was that this binational law would bring the [plarties closer to legal uniformity in the
areas of dumping and subsidies. Experience, however, has not borne out these predictions.
The [CFTA] panels have stayed strictly within their limited role as interpreters of national
law, resisting the temptation to develop a distinctive jurisprudence." Huntington, supra note
153, at 434 (citations omitted).
It is true that the Mexican legal order as a civil law system differs from the common law
systems in the U.S. and Canada. Even if not based on the structure of the legal system there
are also differences between Canadian and U.S. law, But, as experience under CFTA shows,
"Canadian panelists have adeptly grasped U.S. trade law issues and shown no hesitancy in
quizzing counsel on their position [, and t]he questions of U.S. panelists have reflected their
'informed experience'." Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 21, at 33 (citation omitted). All in
all, "[tihe commonalties and mutual understanding that served so well in the Canada-U.S.
context do not have an analogue in the Mexican context ... Nevertheless, .... these
challenges will also be successfully dealt with . . ." Endsley, supra note 237, at 695. See
also Moyer, supra note 249, at 714 (stating that panels involving Mexico will have to
overcome legal and cultural barriers.). One has to bear in mind first that the AD and CVD
laws are written codes in the U.S. and Canada as well as in Mexico, and, second, that it is
just a question of becoming familiar with each other's system. See Andreas W. Lowenfeld,
Binational Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement, Panel Discussion, (April 23, 1991), supra note 249, at 430-31. See also
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 541. However, it has been asked if it is "realistically possible"
to require the panelists to have the same competence as a judge, in part because these panels
are created on an ad hoc basis. See Burke & Walsh, supra note 334, at 544.
"g See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(14).
34 See North American Free Trade Agreement: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904
Binational Panel Review, Rule 18, reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 8686, 8690 (1994) [hereinafter
NAFTA: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904].
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sions are made according to majority rule, but the report may also contain
concurring and dissenting opinions.350 The panel has two choices: either
to confirm the determination of the national authority, or to remand it,3 '
i.e., the panel is not authorized to change the amount of the duty imposed or
otherwise alter the determination. The parties are bound by whatever the
panel decides.352 In case of a remand, the panel is asked to "establish as
brief a time as is reasonable for compliance with [it]."'353 It may become
necessary to review what the national authority undertook on remand. The
same panel will conduct this review and "shall normally issue a final
decision within 90 days ... after such remand action is submitted to it.
'34
NAFTA employs two mechanisms to ensure the proper functioning of the
panel process concerning obstacles from outside and disturbances from inside
the panel. The first category is dealt with by the Safeguard Mechanism,
355
3-o See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1901.2(5).
351 See id. at art. 1904(8).
352 See id. at art. 1904(9). National law cannot install a domestic procedure for appeals
from a panel decision. See id. at art. 1904(11). Although panels decision do not have an
explicit precendential effect, United States courts are allowed to consider them as persuasive
authority (19 U.S.C. 1516a(b)(3)). One author observed that "Itihe nature of chapter 19 panel
decisions reflects the inherent tension between legalistic and pragmatic conceptions of the
binational review system. On one hand, these decisions are considerably more 'binding' than
decisions made under chapter 20 . . . At the same time, panel decisions are quite limited in
scope ... [as] chapter 19 restricts the binding effect of panel decisions to 'the involved
[plarties with respect to the particular matter between the [p]arties that is before the panel,
... [i.e., these decisions] will be accorded no precedential value." Huntington, supra note
153, at 434-35 (citations omitted).
353 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(8). When calculating a reasonable time, the
panel is directed to "tak[e] into account the complexity of the factual and legal issues
involved and the nature of the panel's decision. In no event shall [this] time . . . exceed an
amount of time equal to the maximum amount of time ... permitted by statute for the
competent investigating authority in question to make a final determination in an investi-
gation." Id.
354 Id. at art. 1904(8).
355 See id. at art. 1905. The Safeguard Mechanism will be discussed only very briefly
since the aim of this procedure is less connected with the resolution of actual disputes than
it is to securing a domestic legal environment in which a panel can operate.
Consultations can be requested when "a [p]arty alleges that the application of another
[p]arty's domestic law:
(a) has prevented the establishment of a panel requested by the complaining
[plarty;
(b) has prevented a panel requested by the complaining [p]arty from
rendering a final decision;
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the second by the Extraordinary Challenge Procedure.356
ii. Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
The Agreement tries to safeguard the panel review system by providing
for consultations and the creation of a special committee when a party
alleges that another party's domestic law "has prevented the implementation
of the decision of a panel ... or denied it binding force and effect" or has
frustrated the proceedings in other ways.357 In such a case the complaining
party can ask for consultations, which are to start within 15 days following
the request.358 If the consultations do not lead to a result after 45 days, a
"special committee" is established within 15 days after the complaining party
requests its formation.359
The three special committee members are selected from the same roster
and in the same way as the Extraordinary Challenge Committee mem-
bers.360 The parties submit briefs and make submissions and oral argu-
ments upon which the committee bases its initial report, due 60 days after
its members are selected.36' A final report including separate, anonymous
opinions is to be issued 30 days thereafter.362
If the committee holds that the party complained against is responsible for
non-compliance with the panel report or otherwise impairing the panel
(c) has prevented the implementation of the decision of a panel requested
by the complaining [p]arty or denied it binding force and effect with respect
to the particular matter that was before the panel; or
(d) has resulted in a failure to provide opportunity for review of a final
determination by a[n independent] panel or court..."
Id. at art. 1905(1). CFTA did not contain similar "safeguarding" provisions. See Winham,
supra note 252, at 268.
356 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(13) & Annex 1904.13.
311 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1905(1). A party can call for consultations also
when it alleges that the other party's law denied it the possibility to obtain panel review,
prevented establishment of a panel or prevented a panel from rendering final decision. Id.
at art. 1905(1).
351 See id. at art. 1905(1).
9 See id. at art. 1905(2) & (3).
360 See id. at art. 1905(4) & (5); Annex 1904.13.
" See id. at art. 1905(6), Annex 1905.6. See also CANNON, supra note 304, at 105. For
the special committee's rules of procedure, see NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1905.6. A
schedule for the Safeguard Procedure is found in CANNON, supra note 304, at 105.
362 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1905(6), Annex 1905.6.
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process, the parties are invited to start consultations.36 s The complaining
party is entitled to suspend benefits or the operation of NAFTA Art. 1904
if, after 60 days, the parties are unable to agree on a mutually satisfactory
solution or the responding party does not correct the problem.3 4  The
suspensions are subject to revision by the special committee whether the
suspension of benefits is "manifestly excessive" or the problem has already
been corrected.365 If a complaining party is suspending the operation of
NAFTA Art. 1904, the violating party is allowed to suspend the other party's
benefits as a countermeasure. 366  The effectiveness of the Safeguard
Mechanism has been doubted because its use would indicate a failure of the
entire Chapter 19 process.367
iii. The Extraordinary 'Challenge Procedure
A party may attack a panel's final decision only under the very restricted
conditions of the Extraordinary Challenge Procedure. NAFTA does not
provide for routine appeals because they would not be "consistent with the
general objective of providing expeditious procedures for settling [AD] and
363 See id. at art. 1905(7).
364 See id. at art. 1905(8).
36' See id. at art. 1905(10).
366 See id. at art. 1905(9).
367 See Winham, supra note 252, at 269. "[It appears that given the successful history
of Chapter 19 in the [C]FTA it is unlikely a Special Committee would arise between Canada
and the United States, but it may form a useful sanction to ensure that Mexico... adopts the
domestic practices necessary to implement Article 19. However, it is unlikely that the
extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico could survive any substantial use of Article 1905, since
that article essentially signals a breakdown of the undertakings of Chapter 19 itself." Id.
Conversely, another author finds that this mechanism "should provide added reinforcement
for the binational review system" as "the safeguard mechanism is both more formal and more
specific than the general provisions of chapter 20." Huntington, supra note 153, at 438. See
also CANNON, supra note 304, at 107.
The first opinion seems more realistic. If a party in fact sets up legal obstacles with respect
to the establishment of a panel or the implementation of its decision, this party shows no
interest at all in a well-functioning process and will try to obstruct the process wherever it
can. Under these circumstances, the Agreement is practically terminated. See Huntington,
supra note 153, at 438. At the present, this scenario is not very likely to happen because "the
NAFTA countries are taking their obligations under the NAFTA and its side agreements
seriously and are willing to take steps to resolve the disputes, which is what the dispute
resolution process is intended to achieve." Gonzalez, supra note 220, at 366.
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[CVD] matters. '"" But of course, one could ask if only speed should
matter in light of the complex nature of the cases.369 The Extraordinary
Challenge Procedure must not be considered as a regular appeal; it is in fact
far from that.370
The cause of the complaint, which has to be filed within a "reasonable
time" after the panel's final decision, must fall within one of the three
categories listed in the Agreement, i.e., personal failure of a panel member,
a serious disregard by the panel of a principal procedural provision, or an
obvious misuse of its limited powers.37' Secondly, it is necessary that "any
of [these] actions ... has materially affected the panel's decision and
threatens the integrity of the binational panel review process. 372
Thus, in contrast to the Chapter 19 panels which work within the limits
of the existing domestic law, "challenge committees construing and applying
- See JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 535. See also Moyer, supra note 249, at 716.
3 See Burke & Walsh, supra note 334, at 539-41 (stating that "[iff one chooses to look
any deeper than the simple issue of speed, however, the elimination of routes to appeal is
clearly troublesome").
370 See APPLETON, supra note 20, at 140; Huntington, supra note 153, at 437.
"Extraordinary challenges are not designed to act as an appeal court for disputants who are
displeased with the result of the panels. Rather, [they] are designed to consider issues of
impropriety which bring the entire system of panel review into question." APPLETON, supra
note 20, at 140. Already under CFTA, the ECC was not to function as an appellate tribunal.
See In re Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from Canada, available in Westlaw, 1991 WL
153112 at 3 (June 14, 1991); U.S. Dept. of Commerce Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, 100th Cong., 69, 75-76 (1988) (testimony of M. Jean Anderson, former Chief
Counsel for International Trade).
371 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(13). The article requires a party to allege that
(i) a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct[,] bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out
in... Article [1904], for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard
of review...
Id. It is noteworthy that CFTA did not contain the failure to apply the correct standard of
review as an example of an act beyond the panel's competence. This was added at the
demand of the U.S. See CANNON, supra note 304, at 229-30. "The purpose of the change
is to maximize the uniformity of panel decisions, with each other and with established U.S.
law." Endsley, supra note 237, at 685 (citation omitted).
372 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(13). Given the aforementioned restrictive
conditions, it is very doubtful whether the "ECC review is intended to promote uniformity
between panel decisions," as one author wrote. See Deyling, supra note 313, at 370.
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[the Article 1904(3)] are fashioning a new jurisprudence., 373 The function-
ing of the panel process will "undoubtedly" be affected by the newly created
case law. 374  Therefore, it has been predicted that "the arbitral model of
nonreviewable dispute resolution will remain intact" if the decisions issued
by the Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) "continue to limit recourse
to extraordinary challenges to truly extraordinary abuses of the Chapter 19
panel process. 375
Once a complaint has been filed, the parties are given 15 days to set up
a three-person ECC.376  The committee members are "judges or former
judges" listed in a pre-established roster.377 Every party nominates one
committee member, and the drawing of lots decides which party is to select
the third member.378 "Even though this selection process is thorough and
attempts to eliminate bias by leaving the deciding ECC to ... lottery, it still
does not completely eliminate potential bias. 379
Rules of procedure that have to be established by the parties "shall provide
for a decision ... within 90 days. '3 0  The ECC analyzes the legal and
factual aspects of the initial case as well as the panel's findings and
conclusions, and it determines whether the extraordinary challenge is
justified.3"' If it is not, the committee will deny the challenge, thereby
371 See Moyer, supra note 249, at 724.
374 Id.
375 id.
376 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1904.13(1).
377 Id. Compared to NAFTA Chapter 20 panel roster of up to 30 persons and the Chapter
19 panel roster of 75 persons, the 15-person roster for the extraordinary challenge committee
is relatively small, which may also indicate that the negotiating parties did not consider the
extraordinary challenge procedure to be used very often. Nevertheless, they gave high
priority to the qualifications of the committee members, requiring them to be or have been
judges. Just the same, one author has criticized that, in contrast to Chapter 19 panelists, the
ECC members "are not supposed to be specialists in trade law [but] generalists [which]
leave[s] the problem of [their] unfamiliarity with the other countries' standard of judicial
review." Bessko, supra note 250, at 353-54.
378 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1904.13(1).
37' Bessko, supra note 250, at 354.
380 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at Annex 1904.13(2).
31 See id. at art. 1904(13) & Annex 1904.13(3). "By expanding the period of review
[which was 30 days under CFI'A] and requiring ECCs to look at the panel's underlying legal
and factual analysis [which was not contained in CFTA], the changes to Annex 1904 clarify
that an ECC's responsibilities do not end with simply ensuring that the panel articulated the
correct standard of review. Rather, ECCs are to examine whether the panel analyzed the
substantive law and underlying facts." Statement of Administrative Action, reprinted in
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upholding the original panel's decision.8 2 But if the ECC finds that the
complaint is justified, the panel's decision will be remanded or vacated.38 3
In the latter situation, a panel composed of new members will reinvestigate
the case.3 4
D. Criticism and Reform Proposals of NAFTA
Numerous suggestions for reform have been proposed, some of which
have already been made for CFTA. Among them was the proposal of the
Joint Working Group of the Canadian, Mexican, and United States bar
associations to establish a permanent and independent Free Trade Tribunal
for the interpretation of NAFTA.385  However, NAFTA negotiators
considered such an institution undesirable or politically damaging.386 After
the conclusion of NAFTA, the Joint Working Group nevertheless reissued
the proposal for a permanent tribunal responsible for interpretation.387
Similarly, some authors suggested the introduction of a right to appeal
and, consequently, the establishment of a standing Appellate Tribunal for
388 adisputes arising under NAFTA and the side agreements. Such an
appellate tribunal was considered to "facilitate uniformity and coherence in
the interpretation of regional norms. 389
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, TEXTS OF AGREEMENT, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AND REQUIRING SUPPORTING STATEMENTS, H.R.
Doc. No. 103-159, at 646 (1993).




311 See Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working Group on Dispute Settlement, supra note 250, at
863.
316 See Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA Mutation of
the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917, 944-45 (1992).
Instead of an independent tribunal, the NAFTA parties preferred to leave the question of
interpretation to themselves. See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2003.
387 See The Joint Working Group of the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar
Association, and the Barra Mexicana Report on Dispute Settlement Procedures in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 27 INT'L LAW. 831, 835 (1993). See also Siqueiros, supra
note 224, at 393-94.
388 See CANNON, supra note 304, at 224; Burke & Walsh, supra note 334, at 562;
Deyling, supra note 313, at 370; Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 91-93.
389 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 16, at 92. See also CANNON, supra note 304, at 174.
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By the same token, it has been proposed to establish a permanent panel
for Chapter 19 and 20 disputes which "would relieve the Secretariat of
having to find eligible panelists., 390 A permanent tribunal would "develop
a consistent jurisprudence" more easily than ad hoc panels. 39' But the
creation of a permanent tribunal might also cause problems. Given the fact
that the arbitration procedures under CFTA has been used only five times,
it is hard to believe that a permanent institution "would have enough work
to justify its existence."'3 92 Also, the possible damage done by "an uncon-
genial tribunal" is much greater than that from an ad hoc panel which is
dissolved after one dispute.393
Another point of criticism concerns the secrecy of the proceedings.39
It was proposed to open them more so that the public can have access not
only to the final panel report but also to other documents like party
submissions.395
Furthermore, the effectiveness of sanctions in the form of retaliatory
measures has been questioned. 396  "[B]ecause of the size difference and
relative trade dependence of Mexico and Canada on the United States, [a]
retaliatory suspension of benefits of 'equivalent effect' would hurt Mexico
and Canada proportionately more than the United States. 397
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In order to evaluate the different settlement regimes, this chapter will
compare the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Understanding
and NAFTA settlement procedures. Generally it can be said that for a
comparative study, the DSU panel proceedings as well as the system of
Chapter 20 and the Side Agreements should be regarded as being on one
level, whereas Chapter 19 and the DSU appeal process on another. The
reason is that both the Chapter 19 panel and the Appellate Body review an
390 See Rosa, supra note 224, at 301-02. See also Castel, supra note 230, at 126; Johnson,
supra note 293, at 2185-86.
391 See Johnson, supra note 293, at 2185.
3 See id. at 2186. See also Garvey, supra note 222, at 452.
393 See Johnson, supra note 293, at 2186. See also Oelstrom, supra note 224, at 790 n.68.
394 See Oelstrom, supra note 224, at 790.
... See Bialos & Siegel, supra note 73, at 620.
396 See Hage, supra note 230, at 375-76; Rosa, supra note 224, at 298. Of course, the
same arguments can be used to oppose the present system of sanctions under the WTO.
397 Rosa, supra note 224, at 298-99. See also Barber, supra note 301, at 1016.
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initial process, whereas in the other cases it is the first proceeding. Chapter
19 differs in most aspects from the other agreements which have, very
basically, the same structure.
A major difference between the Agreements is that for any conflict that
arises under any of the WTO agreements, a single procedure is to be
chosen,39 whereas NAFTA Chapter 19, Chapter 20 and the Side Agree-
ments set up their own systems and institutions. 399 However, common to
the DSU, NAFTA Chapter 20, and the Side Agreements is the establishment
of permanent institutions that are distinguishable from the contracting parties,
even if composed thereof.' These bodies (DSB, FTC, Council for Labor
Cooperation, and Council for Environmental Cooperation) play an important
role in the settlement process in that they convene arbitral panels.40' It
should be noted here that the voting modus in the bodies differs: the DSB
decides by "negative" consensus, °2 the FTC and both Side Agreement
Councils basically by consensus.4 3
A. Consultations
Another commonality is that at the beginning of a resolution procedure,
nearly all agreements require the disputants to start consultations in order to
try to settle the dispute as early as possible.4°4 The exception is Chapter
19, which does not require consultations.
398 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 1(1).
399 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2), 1903, 1904, 2001, 2006-19; NAAEC,
supra note 24, at art. 8, 22-36; NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 8, 20-41.
400 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 2(1); NAFrA, supra note 20, at art. 2001(1); NAAEC,
supra note 24, at art. 8(1); NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 8(1). An exception is NAFTA
Chapter 19 which does not create a permanent body. See NAFTA, supra note 20, at arts.
1901-11.
"o See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 6(1); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2008(2); NAAEC,
supra note 24, at art. 24(1); NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 25(1). It is unique that the DSB,
in this regard the most powerful institution, adopts the panel reports. See DSU, supra note
82, at art. 16(1) & (4). Under the other agreements, with the exception of Chapter 19,
NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(9), adoption of panel reports is left to the parties. See
NAFMA, supra note 20, at art. 2018(1); NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 33; NAALC, supra
note 25, at art. 38(1).
4 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 6(1), 16(4), 17(14), 22(6).
a See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2001(4); NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 9(6);
NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 9(6).
40" See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 4(2); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2006(1); NAAEC,
supra note 24, at art. 22(1); NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 27(1).
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B. Establishment of a Review Panel
Between the consultation and the panel phase the agreements work
differently. Provided that consultations have failed, under the WTO, the
parties ask the DSB to establish a panel. 4°5 In the NAFTA regime, under
Chapter 20, the parties have to ask for an FTC meeting,4 and only in case
of their failure to reach a solution can a request for a panel be made.4
7
The wording of Chapter 20 and especially Chapter 19 suggests that the
parties have a right to a panel. 4° The same is basically true for the DSU
because the DSB decides the establishment of a panel by "negative"
consensus. 4°9 All systems except Chapter 19 propose additional means of
resolving disputes such as good offices, conciliation, and other similar
mechanisms-the DSU during the consultation phase, 410 and Chapter 20
during the Commission meeting.41' Thus, the drafters of both regimes
encourage the parties to try to settle their disputes as early as possible.
It is interesting to see that the DSU allows only the allegedly affected
party to issue a request for the establishment of a panel,412 whereas Chapter
19 and Chapter 20 entitle both parties to do soft
3
All agreements provide for the establishment of a roster from which the
panelists are usually selected.1 4 They all require the panelists to meet
certain conditions 415 and under all agreements the parties choose the
panelists. However, the method of selection differs. Chapter 20 employs a
"reverse selection": first, the chair of the panel has to be agreed upon, and
then two citizens of the other party are to be selected by the disputants.1 6
Under Chapter 19 each party selects two panelists, both parties have to agree
4o See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 5(4).
406 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(1).
4o7 See id. at art. 2008(1); NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 24(1); NAALC, supra note 25,
at art. 29(1).
4m See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2), Annex 1901.2(2), art. 2008(2).
409 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 6(1).
410 See id. at art. 5.
411 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(5)(b).
412 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 5(4), 6(1).
413 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(2), (5), 2008(1).
144 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(4); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2), Annex
1901.2(1) & (2), art. 2009 (1) & (3).
415 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(1) & (2); NAFMA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2),
Annex 1901.2(1) & (2), art. 2009(2), 2010(1).
416 See NAFMA, supra note 20, at art. 201 1(1)(b) & (c).
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on a fifth, and the chairman is appointed by majority vote of the panel-
ists.41 7 The DSU stipulates that the disputing parties find an accord with
respect to the panelists which are proposed by the WTO Secretariat.4 8 Not
all agreements provide for panels of five persons:41 9 the DSU prefers three
persons, and a five-member panel is considered exceptional.420 In case the
parties are unable to agree on the panelists, each agreement contains a safety
mechanism in order to prevent a blockage of the process.42'
C. Panel Proceedings
The panel proceedings are also very similar. Under all agreements the
parties are accorded the right to present their arguments in written form and
orally4 22 in order to ensure a fair process. Nearly all of the proceedings are
confidential,423 which is necessary to guarantee that the panels function
well; otherwise the panelists would be exposed to influences from outside.
In contrast to the purely binational process employed by Chapter 19,424
third parties are entitled under the other agreements either to participate
during hearings and to make and receive submissions or to join a panel
425proceeding as a complaining party. The reason may be that a Chapter
19 panel has to supervise the correct application of national law, usually an
unknown field for a third party. The question is whether national law has
been enforced and not if it has been applied correctly. Moreover, the
4,7 See id. at art. 1901(2), Annex 1901.2(2).
418 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(6) & (7).
419 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2), Annex 1901.2(2) & (3), art. 201 1(1)(a).
420 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 8(5).
421 See id. at art. 8(7); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1901(2), Annex 1901.2(2)-(4), art.
201 1(1)(b) & (d).
422 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 12(1), Appendix 3(4) & (5); NAFTA: Rules of
Procedure for Article 1904, Rules 55-69, supra note 349, at 8694-97; NAFTA, supra note 20,
at art. 2012(1)(a).
423 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 14, Appendix 3(2) & (3); NAFTA: Rules of Procedure
for Article 1904, Rule 18, supra note 349, at 8690; NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2012(1)(b).
Unfortunately, it is not clear whether confidentiality also plays a role for NAAEC and
NAALC proceedings. The agreements do not deal with this issue, i.e., it is not a compulsory
matter to be included in the Model Rules of Proceedings that are to be established by the
Councils. See NAAEC, supra note 24, at art. 28; NAALC, supra note 25, at art. 33.
424 See NAFIA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(1).
42 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 9, 10; NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2006(3), 2008(3)
& (4), 2011(2), 2013.
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determination of AD and CVD duties and the standards of review are highly
complex and complicated, thus demanding a very thorough knowledge of the
national law in question.
In cases brought under the DSU and Chapter 20, the panel issues an initial
and a final report.426 Only Chapter 19 instructs the panelists to write a
single report,427 probably to speed up the procedure. With the exception
of the DSU the agreements allow separate opinions to be drafted.428 The
common law tradition of dissenting opinions did not find a place within the
confines of the WTO on the panel level.
The force granted to panel reports varies from agreement to agreement,
and the agreements are very different in handling the acceptance and
implementation of reports. Chapter 19 panel reports are the "strongest"
because they are binding on the parties and do not need to be accepted by
another body. 429 Furthermore, the only way to attack such a report is
through the very restrictive Extraordinary Challenge Procedure.43° Chapter
20 panel reports are not adopted either, but they are not accorded any
binding force at all. The parties are encouraged only to use them as
suggestions for a mutually agreed upon solution. Therefore, politicians can
exercise the largest influence in these cases because the disputing parties
have to agree on a solution and are not required to conform to the panel
report.43' Under the DSU, it is the Dispute Settlement Body, and not the
parties, which adopts the report by "negative consensus" without the
possibility of altering it.432 Thus, the losing party has only a very limited
possibility to block the adoption of the report.
D. Appeals Procedures
Chapter 19 and the DSU present two unique features, the Extraordinary
Challenge Committee433 and the Appellate Body.4 4  While these two
426 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 15(2); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2016, 2017.
427 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(8).
428 See NAFTA: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904, supra note 349, Rule 72 at 8697;
NAFrA, supra note 20, at art. 2016(3), 2017(1) & (2).
'29 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(9).
410 See id. at art. 1904(13), Annex 1904.13.
431 See id.
432 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 16(4).
433 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904(13), Annex 1904.13.
43 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 17.
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bodies differ very much concerning their composition, their function and
their power, Chapter 20 does not contain a similar procedure for judicial
review of a panel decision. One reason might be that Chapter 20 still
enables the parties to exercise a much larger influence on the process, i.e.,
block or delay it, or find a solution different from the panel's proposition.
E. Sanctions
The question of sanctioning the non-implementation of final reports
(issued by the panels and-in case of the DSU-also by the Appellate Body)
or of an agreed-upon solution is similar among the agreements. In the end,
all agreements provide for the suspension of benefits, i.e., self-help.435 The
DSU and Chapter 20 offer voluntary compensation as an alternative solution
to the suspension of benefits.436 All agreements also entitle the parties to
ask for checking the amount of the suspended benefits.437 Usually it is left
to the parties to supervise if the complained-against party has taken
appropriate action in order to comply with the agreed-upon solution or the
final report. 438 Thus, it is an exception that the Dispute Settlement Body
exercises this function for disputes arising under the WTO agreements.
439
F. Time Frames
The maximum time frames from the initiation of a dispute settlement
procedure until the delivery of the final report are very different. Chapter
20 establishes the shortest time limits. It aims at having the panel issue its
report after not more than 255 days."'0 After another 30 days, the winning
party is allowed to suspend benefits.' Chapter 19 requires the panel to
issue its report after 315 days at the latest.442 It takes another 210 days for
431 See id. at art. 22; NAFFA, supra note 20, at art. 19, 20.
4' See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(1); NAFMA, supra note 20, at art. 2018(2).
437 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 22(6); NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1905(10), art.
2019(3).
438 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1905(1)(d) & (2), 2018(1), 2019(1).
419 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 21.
440 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(1), 2008(1), 2011(1)(b) & (c), (3), 2016(2),
2017(1). In this and some of the following cases the individual time frames given in the
respective articles have been added up to calculate the complete time limit.
4 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2019(1).
44' See id. at art. 1904(14).
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the winning party to suspend benefits.443 The reason why Chapter 19
panel proceedings take longer than those under Chapter 20 might be that AD
and CVD issues are highly complex and-as the CFTA experience has
shown-need more time. The usual time under the DSB is six months, with
a maximum of nine months4" (plus, at the most, another 60 days for the
adoption of the report445). If an appeal is filed, the entire procedure will
last 15 months at the very most44" (plus not more than 30 days for the
adoption of the Appellate Body report"7). With up to nearly 16 months,
the period until sanctions can be applied is comparatively long.
G. Amendments to Procedure
Another question in this context is whether the parties are able not only
to alter the given time limits, which might make the procedures even longer,
but also to depart from other procedural stipulations. In this regard, Chapter
19 contains the strictest regime. There exists no way for the disputing
parties to deviate from the established provisions by simple accord.448 The
parties have somewhat more freedom under the DSU because they may
determine the panel's Terms of Reference, 449 but all other provisions
(including the time limits) have to be followed. Chapter 20 allows the
parties to modify most of the stipulations with the exception of those
governing the establishment of a panel and the application of sanctions.45 °
Consequently, the possibility for the parties to take deviations from the
course described in the agreements because of political considerations varies
a lot.
45 1
443 See id. at art. 1905(2), (3), (6), (7), (8), Annex 1905.6.
' See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 12(9).
44 See id. at art. 16(4).
446See id. at art. 12(9), 17(5).
44 See id. at art. 17(14).
"8 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 1904. However, the Safeguard Mechanism allows
the parties to make individual agreements. See id. at art. 1905(2) & (3).
449 See DSU, supra note 82, at art. 7(1).
410 See NAFTA, supra note 20, at art. 2007(1)(d), 2008(1)(c), 4(b), 2012(2), 2016(1) &
(2), 2017(1).
451 At least early events under NAFTA show not only that deviations from the Agreement
are made, but that
NAFTA parties will violate the Agreement under sufficient pressure from
domestic political forces. Certainly this is the case in the U.S.-Mexico
trucking dispute (which is the product of pressure by the U.S. trucking
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Moreover, Chapter 19 also differs from the other agreements' panel
proceedings. In a comparative study, the DSU panel proceedings and the
Chapter 20 system should be considered together whereas the Chapter 19
panel and the DSU appeal process should be considered separately. Chapter
19 and the Appellate Body review an initial process, while the DSU panel
proceedings and the Chapter 20 system are the initial process. Thus, Chapter
19 differs in most respects from the other agreements.
H. Political Influence
The amount of political influence varies throughout the different
agreements. Politicians do not have any chance to interfere during a Chapter
19 process. Under the DSU it exists but is very limited because of the
"negative consensus" stipulation. Under Chapter 20 political interventions
are possible at every moment, therefore the degree of political control varies
a lot between the different proceedings.
In sum, an effective dispute resolution mechanism must provide for a
timely investigation with binding and enforceable conclusions, prevent
multiple jeopardy and eliminate tactical advantages and the possibility of
retaliatory trade legislation.452 The Chapter 19 dispute settlement proce-
dure meets these requirements, but the DSU and Chapter 20 only come
close.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis conducted in this article shows that most of the systems for
settling disputes "seem to reflect the continuing subordination of law to
politics in the realm of international trade." '453 The degrees, of course, vary
industry) and the Helms-Burton Act (which is the result of legislation designed
to satisfy the demands of Cuban-Americans during an election year) . . . A
NAFTA party could take a hard line approach to another country's politically
motivated breaches of the Agreement by immediately demanding consultations
and rapidly escalating the dispute to panel proceedings; however, the early
NAFTA experience shows that that is not what is happening. Rather, the
NAFTA parties have displayed tremendous sensitivity to the domestic
electoral pressures faced by their fellow trading partners.
Lopez, supra note 259, at 206.
452 See Gastle, supra note 31, at 736.
453 See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 26, at 406.
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significantly. There has, however, been a general tendency to reduce the
political influence and to become more adjudicatory the longer the agreement
exists, the more complex and complicated it gets, and the more signatories
it has. It is a development away from the negotiation-based settlement
process. For the GATT, it was a necessity to render the dispute settlement
mechanism more rule-based4 4 because the negotiation-based system failed
and was no longer able to resolve disputes effectively. The same cannot be
said for NAFTA, of course, but NAFTA has two important features
distinctive from either the WTO or the GATT. First, NAFTA itself is more
adjudicatory than the GATI ever was (even if it is less adjudicatory than the
WTO mechanism). There were three possibilities under CFTA for going
through the general dispute settlement mechanism, and under NAFTA there
is only one. Insofar as it is possible to speak of straightening the procedure
of dispute settlement procedure, NAFTA has taken a step in this direction.
The second feature that distinguishes NAFTA and the WTO is the number
of signature states. The WTO currently counts 130 members, NAFTA
"only" three. For a system that relies heavily on negotiations, it is easier to
reach an agreement among three rather than among 130 states.455 The
need for a strict rule-based system is not as urgent for NAFTA as it was for
the WTO. 45
6
A yet unresolved issue is the problem of how to deal with a recalcitrant
party that refuses to comply with a ruling. On the level of international
economic treaties, it seems difficult to coerce a country to respect the
4
' The step from the GATT to the WTO was the most definite with regard to making the
resolution system more legalistic, but "[i]f one looks over a longer period, one sees a trend
towards judicialization of the GATT regime. This can be seen in the development of a legal
staff at the GATT, and in the increasing length and complexity of legal arguments of GATT
panels. However, the most important indicator is simply the frequency of GATT panels. In
the first ten years of the GAIT, there were some twenty rulings made by GATT panels
resulting from complaints brought by contracting parties. This number dropped off sharply
during the 1960s, and then began to climb again in the 1970s. In the decade 1980-9, the
number increased to forty-four rulings." WINHAM, supra note 2, at 63. See also Huntington,
supra note 153, at 443.
It is easier to use personal influence and to exercise political pressure with a small
number of countries. And it makes a difference whether it is 129 or two partners who have
to be convinced. See Oelstrom, supra note 224, at 788-89; Straight, supra note 271, at 229.
One might also remember that, in the first years, with fewer members and less complex
matters, the GAT" 1947 system worked well.
456 See Huntington, supra note 153, at 443.
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provisions.457 The suspension of benefits is the usual sanction; this,
however, does not work effectively.458 Another much stricter possibility
is simply to cancel the membership of that country.459 But it seems that
politicians do not want to go so far, fearing that it might be their own
country which, for whatever reason, cannot-or does not want to-comply
with a ruling and then finds itself excluded.
Another issue presented is whether the pragmatic approach or the legalistic
approach is preferable. Without a doubt, adjudication is the more effective
process. On the other hand, it always results in a "winner and loser"
situation, which can generate friction.461 Furthermore, it becomes more
difficult to amend or change any provision in the agreements because the
parties are unable to make "adjustments" during the dispute settlement
procedure.
Nevertheless, even if effectiveness is only one aspect of evaluating a
conflict resolution system, it is one of the major aspects. It is important that
a dispute resolution system function well in order to avoid creating
frustration with the entire agreement. In this respect, the WTO seems well
equipped to accept more member states and to govern more agreements,
while still providing an effective mechanism for conflict resolution. In the
event that significantly more countries become parties to NAFTA (or a
succeeding agreement), however, the treaty will have to change its general
dispute settlement system and put more emphasis on a legalistic approach;
otherwise it is very likely that whole system will block and fail.
417 See Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 188.
458 See Bello & Holmer, supra note 182, at 1103; Gastle, supra note 31, at 811.
459 See Cocuzza & Forabosco, supra note 77, at 188.
460 None of the analyzed treaties contains a provision that allows other member states to
exclude a recalcitrant party.
46 MANLEY 0. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 213 (1944).
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ANNEX A
I. THE SIDE AGREEMENTS
A. The Environmental Side Agreement
The NAAEC stipulates the establishment of a Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation (CEC) made up of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint
Public Advisory Committee.' The Council, the governing body of the CEC,
consists of "cabinet-level or equivalent representatives".2 It convenes at
least once a year and, among other issues, "address[es] questions and
differences that may arise between the [p]arties regarding the interpretation
or application of [the] Agreement."' 3 The Council arrives at its decisions by
consensus.4 Assistance to the Council is provided by the Secretariat5 and
advice is provided by the Joint Public Advisory Committee, which is
composed of 15 members appointed in equal numbers by the parties.6
B. The Labor Side Agreement
A Commission for Labor Cooperation consisting of a Council and a
Secretariat is set up under the Labor Side Accord.7 The Commission is
governed by the Council, a body consisting of the labor ministers which
convenes at least once a year.8 As is true under the Environmental Side
Agreement, one of the Council's responsibilities is to address disputes
'See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-
Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 at art. 8 [hereinafter NAAEC]. For developments within the scope
of the CEC, see its website at Commission for Environmental Cooperation (visited July 12,
1997) <http://www.cec.org>.
2 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 9(1), 10(1).
' See id. Some of the Council's responsibilities also include strengthening the cooperation
on the development and continuing improvement of environmental laws, observing the
implementation of the Agreement, and furthering the cooperation between the parties
regarding environmental matters. Id. at art. 10(1)(b) & (f), 10(3).
4 See id. at art. 9(6).
5 See id. at art. 11(5).
6 See id. at art. 16(1) & (4).
7 See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 1499 at art. 8 [hereinafter NAALC].
s See id. at art. 9(1) & (3).
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concerning the Agreement's interpretation and application. 9 Decision-
making is subject to consensus.'0 The Secretariat supports the Council in
"exercising its functions"." The Commission is assisted by National
Administrative Offices (NAO), which each party is directed to establish at
the federal level. 2
II. DISPUTE SETLEMENT UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND THE
LABOR SIDE AGREEMENTS
The Side Agreements distinguish between disputes arising out of a
"persistent pattern of failure by [a] party to effectively enforce" its environ-
mental laws or particular labor standards and all other disputes" ("enforce-
ment matters and non-enforcement matters" 4 ). In order to resolve the latter
ones, the NAAEC and the NAALC simply encourage the parties to "make
every attempt through consultations and cooperation to resolve [the] matter"
without further specification."
The way both Side Agreements deal with the first category of conflicts is
"far more intricate."' 6 Their system is nearly identical when it comes to the
consultation phase of the settlement procedure, which is why they will be
analyzed together for the most part. But in contrast to the Environmental
Side Accord, the NAALC requires the parties to follow an initial process
before the dispute resolution concerning "enforcement matters" begins the
consultation phase.
9 See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 10(g). For the Council's functions, see id. at art. 10,
11.
'0 See id. at art. 9(6).
" See id. at art. 13(1).
32 See id. at art. 8(1), 15. "Each NAO shall serve as a point of contact with ...
governmental agencies of that [p]arty,. . . NAOs of other [p]arties, [and] ... the Secretariat."
See id. at art. 16(1).
3 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 20(1) & 22(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 20 &
27(1). A "persistent pattern of failure" means "a sustained or recurring course of action or
inaction.... and does not include a single instance or case." NAAEC, supra note 1, at art.
45; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 49. One author has noted correctly that it still remains
unclear what exactly constitutes a "persistent pattern of failure." See RAJ BHALA,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1349 (1996).
'4 David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from Early Experience, 32
TEX. INT'L L.J. 163, 185 (1997).
15 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 20(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 20.
6 See Lopez, supra note 14, at 185.
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A. The Pre-Stage under the Labor Side Agreement
Under the Labor Side Agreement, a NAO may ask for consultations with
another NAO concerning "the other [p]arty's labor law, its administration,
or labor market conditions."' 7 Also, a meeting at the ministerial level may
be requested "regarding any matter within the scope of [the] Agreement." 8
Should the ministerial consultations not lead to a resolution, the Council for
Labor Cooperation, upon request of any consulting party, establishes an
Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). 9 The ECE's analysis is limited
to "patterns of practice by each [plarty in the enforcement of its occupational
safety and health and other technical labor standards."20  Following the
Rules of Procedure established by the Council, the three ECE members, who
have to meet certain qualifications, are chosen from a roster whenever
possible.2
After gathering information from all possible sources and receiving
comments thereon and submissions from the parties, the ECE issues a draft
report within 120 days after it is established.22 In this report, the ECE
assesses the matter in question, draws its conclusions, and recommends
17 NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 21(1). "As of December 1996, seven controversies were
formally submitted to the NAOs ... Two of [those seven] progressed to the level of
ministerial consultations." Lopez, supra note 14, at 195.
18 See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 22(1).
'9 See id. at art. 23(1). An ECE can only be established if the matter is either "trade-
related" or "covered by mutually recognized labor laws." Id. at art. 23(3). Friction might
occur when it comes to decide what is meant by these expressions as no further definition is
given by the agreement itself. See BHALA, supra note 13, at 1353.
"As of December 1996, no ECE had been convened to review any labor dispute between
the NAFTA countries." Lopez, supra note 14, at 195.
20 See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 23(2).
21 See id. at art. 24(1)(a)-(c). The Agreement provides that the chair is chosen by the
Council from a roster of experts established in consultation with the International Labor
Organization (ILO), and, "where possible, other members shall be selected from a roster
developed by the [plarties". Id. But no stipulation prescribes exactly the method of how to
choose the other ECE members. Compare NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 24(1)(c), and North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289 & 32 I.L.M.
605 at art. 2011 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA]. Qualifications for the
ECE members are expertise or experience in labor matters or other appropriate disciplines;
they have to be chosen only "on the bases of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment [, and
they have to] be independent of, and not affiliated with or take instructions from, any [plarty
or the Secretariat." See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 24(1)(c).
22 See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 24(1)(d)-(f), 25(1).
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solutions.23 Considering the parties' views on its draft, the ECE has 60
days to present a final report to the Council. 24 Thereafter the parties may
respond to the ECE's recommendations, and "[t]he final report and such
written responses shall be tabled for consideration at the next regular session
of the Council [which] may keep the matter under review. 25
B. Consultations under the Two Side Agreements
Under the NAAEC, the resolution of a dispute of "non-enforcement
matters" starts with a request for consultations between the parties, whereas
under the Labor Side Accord, such a request is possible only after the ECE
has presented its final report.26 Both Agreements require the parties to
23 See id. at art. 25(1).
2A See id. at art. 25(2), 26(1).
25 See id. at art. 26(3) & (4).
' See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 22(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 27(1). A
dispute under both agreements arises when a party alleges that "there has been a persistent
pattern of failure by [another p]arty to effectively enforce" its environmental laws or certain
labor standards which means "a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction beginning
after the date of entry into force of [the Agreements]." See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art.
22(1), 45(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 27(1), 49(1).
It is noteworthy that "[lthe NAAEC contains no environmental injury test, and the
complaining country does not have to show environmental injury to it or to the scofflaw
country." See Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications
for Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 257, 267 (1994).
The Labor Side Accord only allows consultations with respect to "occupational safety and
health, child labor or minimum wage." See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 27(1). Hence the
issue is further limited in comparison to what the ECE is allowed to analyze. The reason for
this limitation and the one stipulated by the NAAEC might be that "[s]ince the process could
result in the imposition of trade sanctions [and monetary penalties] .... it has been restricted
to the most serious cases of enforcement failure." See Christopher Thomas & Gregory A.
Tereposky, The NAFTA and the Side Agreement on Environmental Co-operation, 27 J.
WORLD TRADE 5, 27 (1993). Nevertheless, one author criticized this procedure because "the
wording of Article 27(1) is confusing, and the result is anomalous." See BHALA, supra note
13, at 1354.
As of December 1996, "[n]o NAFTA country formally has alleged that another country has
engaged in a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental laws." See
Lopez, supra note 14, at 188 (citation omitted). No dispute under the NAALC has reached
the stage of party consultation. See Lopez, supra note 14, at 195. One author has observed
that "the Side Accord[s] substantially increased the threshold requirement to begin [the
arbitration] process" because of possible trade sanctions or monetary penalties. See Michael
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"make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution, ' 27 thus
emphasizing the role of consultations in order to obtain a solution at a very
early stage of the dispute.
C. Special Council Session
If no accord is reached after 60 days, any party may ask the respective
Council to convene for a special session within 20 days.28 The Councils
are to "resolve the dispute promptly" by using the advice of experts, by
employing alternative ways of dispute resolution, or by making the
appropriate recommendations.29
D. Panel Phase
If the parties are not able to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution within
60 days after the Councils' meetings, the Council establishes an arbitral
panel upon request and by a two-thirds vote. 30 The introduction of a two-
thirds vote (in contrast to the usual consensus) obviously aims at preventing
the accused party of blocking the process. But, in contrast to the framework
in Chapter 20 of NAFTA, a "panel cannot be formed absent a majority vote
J. Kelly, Bringing a Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord: Difficult Steps
Under a Procedural Paper Tiger, but Movement in the Right Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71,
82 (1996).
7 NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 22(4); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 27(4).
28 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 23(1) & (3); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 28(1) &
(3). The Councils are the Council for Environmental Cooperation and the Council for Labor
Cooperation, respectively.
29 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 23(3); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 28(3).
30 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 24(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 29(1). Both
Side Agreements limit the scope of the panels' investigations. The Environmental Side
Accord authorizes a panel to examine only a case where a persistent pattern of failure of
effectively enforcing the environmental law "relates to a situation involving workplaces, firms,
companies or sectors that produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the
territories of the [p]arties; or (b) that compete, in the territory of the [p]arty complained
against, with goods and services produced or provided by persons of another [p]arty." See
NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 24(1). By the same token, under the NAALC a panel must not
investigate more than the enforcement failure regarding "occupational safety and health, child
labor or minimum wage technical labor standards [that] is: (a) trade-related; and (b) covered
by mutually recognized labor laws." See NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 29(1).
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of the Council."'" The panelists who have to meet certain qualifications
will be chosen from a roster.32 The provisions for the selection process and
the possibility for a third party to join as complainant are the same as
NAFTA Art. 2008 (3) and 201 1.33 The Councils establish Model Rules of
Procedure containing certain procedural guarantees, and the Agreements set
up the Terms of Reference; both are valid until the parties agree other-
wise.' The role of experts is regulated as it is in NAFTA.35
Based on information gathered from the parties, experts, or other
appropriate persons or bodies, the panels distribute an initial report within
180 days after the last panelist is selected. 36  The initial report contains
findings of fact, determines whether there has been a "persistent pattern of
failure" by a party in effectively enforcing its domestic environmental or
labor laws, and, if so, recommends how "to remedy the pattern of non-
enforcement. '37  Separate opinions may be furnished on matters not
unanimously agreed upon.38 A time limit of 30 days is set for the parties
to make comments on the initial report.39
The panels may reexamine the case and reconsider the draft taking such
comments into account and may also ask for the view of another party,
31 See Lopez, supra note 14, at 187.
32 The panelists shall have expertise or experience in environmental or labor law,
respectively, or "its enforcement, or in the resolution of disputes arising under international
agreements, or other relevant scientific, technical or professional expertise or experience; ...
be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability and sound judgment; ... be
independent of, not affiliated with or take instructions from any [p]arty, the [relevant]
Secretariat," or, for disputes on environmental issues only, the Joint Public Advisory
Committee. See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 25(2), 26(1); NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
30(2), 31(1).
33 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 24(2), 27; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 29(2), 32.
3' See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 28; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 33.
35 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 29, 30; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 34, 35;
NAFTA, supra note 21, at art. 2015. In contrast to the NAFTA the Side Agreements do not
provide for the establishment of scientific review boards.
' See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 31(1) & (2); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 36(1) &
(2). The agreements name the sources of information for the panels, but "[h]ow a panel may
ascertain whether there has been a failure of enforcement remains unclear ... Is a high
percentage of enforcement convictions a sign of effective or ineffective enforcement? Are
repeat violations a sign of enforcement failure? The [Agreements do] not answer these
questions." See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 268 (citation omitted).
" See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 31(2); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 36(2).
38 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 31(3); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 36(3).
31 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 31(4); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 36(4).
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before issuing a final report within 60 days after the presentation of the
draft.4
E. Implementation and Enforcement of Panel Reports
If the panel finds a "persistent pattern of failure" regarding the enforce-
ment of environmental or labor laws by the party complained against, the
Agreements propose a "mutually satisfactory action plan" agreed upon by the
parties initially.41 Three articles and three annexes in each agreement lay
down a very meticulous scheme concerning implementation and sanctioning
of such a plan.42  The detailed stipulations try to cover every imaginable
situation. A variety of possibilities, including time frames ranging from not
more than 60 days to at least 180 days, is described in a scrupulous but also
"bewildering" manner.
43
Basically, there are two situations for a complaining party to request the
relevant Council to reconvene the panel. The first occurs when the parties
do not agree on an action plan.44 In this case, the reconvened panel
analyzes whether the plan is sufficient.45 If it is not, the panel develops its
own action plan.46 Additionally, it has the power but not the duty to
impose a monetary enforcement assessment.47 Secondly, the panel may be
reassembled when the full implementation of an action plan is in doubt, no
40 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 31(5), 32; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 36(5), 37.
4' See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 33; NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 38.
42 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34-36 & Annexes 34-36B; NAALC, supra note 7,
at art. 39-41 & Annexes 39-41B.
43 See Michael Reisman & Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, J. WORLD TRADE, June 1995, at 5, 32. In order to make the confusing treaty
provisions easier to understand, the provisions are simplified in the following description,
leaving out the time limits and some details that are not necessary to understand how the
system generally works. A helpful floating chart is displayed in Reisman & Wiedman, supra,
at 36-38.
4 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(1)(a) & (2); NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
39(1)(a) & (2).
45 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(4)(a) & (6); NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
39(4)(a) & (6).
4 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(4)(a) & (6); NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
39(4)(a) & (6).
47 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(4)(b) & Annex 34; NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
39(4)(b) & Annex 39.
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matter if it is an agreed-upon or a panel-developed plan.48 If the panel
determines that the implementation is insufficient, it is required to impose a
monetary enforcement assessment. 49  All assessments are limited with
respect to their amount.50 If a party does not pay, the complaining party
is entitled to suspend NAFTA trade benefits "in an amount no greater than
that sufficient" to collect the assessment through tariffs.5 Once the
reconvened panel decides that either the monetary enforcement has been paid
or the action plan has been fully implemented, the "suspension of benefits
... shall be terminated."52 Should the recalcitrant party suspect that the
suspension of benefits is "manifestly excessive," the panel may be recon-
vened on request.
53
48 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(l)(b) & (3); NAALC, supra note 7, at art.
39(1)(b) & (3).
49 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 34(5), (6), 35 & Annex 34; NAALC, supra note 7,
at art. 39(5), (6), 40 & Annex 39. The fines are to be paid into funds established by the
respective councils and to be used to improve the enforcement of environmental or labor laws
in the party complained against. See NAAEC, supra note 1, at Annex 34(3); NAALC, supra
note 7, at Annex 39(3).
o For the first year after the agreements have entered into force, the monetary
enforcement assessment must not exceed $ 20 million; "[tihereafter [it] shall be no greater
than .007 percent of total trade in goods between the [p]arties during the most recent year for
which data are available." See NAAEC, supra note 1, at Annex 34; NAALC, supra note 7,
at Annex 39. "In 1995, total trade in goods between the three NAFTA parties equaled
approximately $ 383 billion ... Thus, the maximum monetary enforcement assessment that
could have been imposed during 1996 on any party was .007 percent of that amount, or $
26.8 million." Lopez, supra note 14, at 187 n.255 (citation omitted).
5' See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 36(l)-(3), Annexes 36 A & 36 B; NAALC, supra
note 7, art. 41(1)-(3), Annexes 41 A & 41 B.
52 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 36(4); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 41(4).
51 See NAAEC, supra note 1, at art. 36(5); NAALC, supra note 7, at art. 41(5).
'Manifestly excessive' will likely be construed to mean that the suspension of benefits is
greater than the monetary enforcement assessment issued by the panel." Kelly, supra note
26, at 88 n.119.
Questioning the purpose of the monetary penalty, one author predicted that "[p]ublicity and
transparency will prove to be more effective enforcement tools than the symbolic $20 million
fine. In fact, most disputes will be effectively resolved by the council, the ECE or the arbitral
panels, so monetary and trade sanctions will not be relied upon as the primary means of
enforcement." See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA): Good for Jobs, for the Environment, and for America, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 461, 483 (1993).
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Summarizing the process, one scholar noted that
the feature that characterizes it is political adjustment. Despite
the provision for arbitration, modalities of consultation, negotia-
tion, and mediation are employed at every possible opportunity,
even after the arbitrators have presented their final report.
Further, at virtually every stage, even after an arbitration ruling,
the party complained against is responsible for a solution short
of sanctions. The respondent is encouraged at every stage to
improve its enforcement of environmental, health and labor
standards, without having to appear to be responding to threats
from the other governments. The process is designed to avoid
coercive measures, but the possibility of sanctions, and all the
negative political implication they entail, stands at the end of
the line to provide incentive for mediated and negotiated resolu-
tion.'
III. CRITICISMS OF THE SIDE AGREEMENTS
The Side Agreements have been criticized for establishing too lengthy and
too cumbersome a procedure before finally arriving at a solution.55 In the
case of a losing party that "continues to shirk implementation", it can take
up to 1,485 days (i.e., nearly four years) from the initiation of the procedure
See Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution under the
NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 444 (1995).
Interestingly, another author arrived at a partly different conclusion when he reasoned that
"each stage of the process provides an opportunity to apply pressure to get countries to
enforce their environmental [and labor] laws ... [Their obligations] can be enforced against
the United States and Mexico by trade sanctions . .. Moreover, [Canada, Mexico and the
United States] are physical neighbors and interact continuously in many ways. Therefore, the
countries have.., a variety of means to attempt to persuade each other to comply with the
provisions." See Daniel B. Magraw, Jr., Trade Agreements, C990 ALI-ABA 193, 204 (1995).
55 See Karen Vossler Champion, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free Trade
and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 181, 229 (1996);
Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 270; Kelly, supra note 26, at 96; Reisman & Wiedman, supra
note 43, at 33; Alicia A. Samios, NAFTA's Supplemental Agreement: In Need of a Reform,
9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 49, 74 (1996).
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until the imposition of a sanction.56 Due to the time it takes to bring a
complaint under the Side Agreements, "the abuses can continue un-
checked."57
Some critics have doubted if the relatively small monetary enforcement
assessments will contribute to a country's willingness to enforce its labor or
environmental laws.58  However, one author who observed that "[t]he
remedy of retaliation through the suspension of benefits has never proven
effective" welcomed the "unique damages remedy. 59  It has also been
noted that "[plublicity and transparency will prove to be more effective
enforcement tools than the symbolic ... fine[s]." 6
Another object for criticism is the possibility for politicians to intervene
at practically every stage of the settlement process. 61 Nevertheless, this
possibility has been justified by the fact that including labor and environmen-
tal issues in the framework of a trade agreement is "still unique" because
considerable controversy exists with regard to these issues.62 The parties
were very cautious in choosing a "soft law" approach where they retain
considerable control on the whole procedure.63 Also, the scope of the
' See Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 43, at 33. "At a minimum, it would take 755
days from the initiation of a complaint to the attainment of a trade sanction [under the
NAAEC]. While this is lengthy-the same procedure under the NAFTA dispute settlement
process takes only 240 days-it is summary justice compared to the extremely prolonged and
complex procedures to reach trade sanctions in the [NAALC]. Indeed, some commentators
have suggested that complaints about child labor enforcement will be rendered moot because
the victims will no longer be children by the time the Labor Commission would permit trade
sanctions." Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 270 (citations omitted).
5 See Champion, supra note 55, at 229.
58 See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 269 (citing an Administration official who said that
the value of the penalties "would be primarily symbolic"); Reisman & Wiedman, supra note
43, at 32-33. See also Kevin W. Patton, Dispute Resolution under the North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 109-11 (1994);
J. Owen Saunders, NAFTA and the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion: A New Model for International Collaboration on Trade and Environment, 5 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 273, 303 (1994).
39 See Chales M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives for Reform of the Free Trade Agreement of
the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 735, 811, 821
(1995).
60 See Schoenbaum, supra note 53, at 483.
61 See Kelly, supra note 26, at 96 (speaking of "political trapdoors"); Samios, supra note
55, at 75. See also Garvey, supra note 54, at 452.
62 See Garvey, supra note 54, at 452; Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 43, at 33.
63 See Reisman & Wiedman, supra note 43, at 33.
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agreements is very limited. In such "new" fields, the parties obviously did
not want to give up their power. Therefore, politicians prefer a system based
on cooperation over one based on adjudication.'
See Saunders, supra note 58, at 303-04.
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